


The College and New America



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Bruce

THE COLLEGE AND NEW AMERICA

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TO
**THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS**
OR TO
**ANY OTHER GROUP OF MEN
THAT WILL GET THESE THINGS DONE**



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FOREWORD

The Great War has had a revolutionary effect on the minds of men. It has subjected both individuals and institutions to strains which have revealed, as no ordinary pressures can, defects in personal character and training and in social organization which immediately challenge our intellectual attention. The effects will be far reaching; they will be good and lasting effects if causes and ideals are now analyzed so as to give sane direction to the reconstruction of education and the civilization which education serves.

Among all the problems which we face none is more important than that of improving the institutional spirit and mechanism by which an educated American leadership is to emerge from the colleges and universities into the service of an aspiring and troubled world. The higher institutions have carried many splendid traditions, the products of centuries of trial and error. One after another they have been super-

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imposed as insight and necessity have determined their coming. Often they have fallen into accidental relationships not thought-determined. Some ideals and methods fitted to a previous century's needs carry an academic respectability not consistent with the requirements of our own time. A new estimate of college functions and their relations is required if education for leadership is to be a tidy and effective process.

The university man has not had his traditions subjected to any such keen appraisal as that which fell upon the elementary school during the last part of the nineteenth century or that which now registers itself upon the secondary school. A rigid and thorough going appraisal of college and university is now due. In fact, it is overdue. There has been much current criticism of higher schools during the last ten years, both from lay and professional minds; but it has been partial in character and lacking in a fundamental point of view. A critique which is basic and thorough is welcome at this time when our academic minds are so completely stirred that the profession is eager for rational assistance. Some reconstruction of the

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American college is coming. The wisdom of the immediate reconstruction depends upon the analysis of society's requirements of the institution and upon an unbiased judgment of the worth of existing collegiate attitudes and processes.

It will be best for the institution itself if the coming reforms are born of internal impulse. Such an impulse will always be more sympathetic in spirit and better acquainted with the technology of teaching, than an impulse wrought of the distrust of citizens outside our higher schools. The philisophers, who theoretically at least escape the limitations of specialized college chairs, should know their institutions as a whole. If they can know the society which surrounds them as well, they ought to be the academicians best equipped for the task of constructive criticism.

The volume here presented is the work of one such professor of philosophy, academically broad and socially minded. With sympathy and justice he shows us our ancient institutional defects, notes accurately our civic obligations and sends us on our troubled but fruitful way filled with inspiring and constructive thought.

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No volume on higher education which has thus far appeared from the press is more stimulating or useful than the one now offered. It should be read by every college teacher and administrator for it reveals the ineffectiveness of many of our sacred presuppositions and uncriticized academic ideals, and points the way to a better scheme of conscious values and deliberate practices.

HENRY SUZZALLO

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THE COLLEGE AND NEW AMERICA

I

THE CALL OF THE NEW ORDER

For many years the rebuilding of civilization will not permit anything of human worth to go to waste. Already this applies to the material world; it must apply to the intellectual world as well. There will be little time for intellectual fooling; there will be great need for intellectual work.

Now, the colleges have had a unique and important part in the intellectual work of the world. Sometimes they have assumed the place of intellectual leadership. Not only have they helped to teach many of the most prominent leaders of men how to think, and even what to think, but many of those who have done the teaching have been themselves leaders of the

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first rank in the various achievements that we call civilization.

During the World War, the colleges of America were busied with adapting themselves to emergency conditions. Their function, their curricula, their pedagogy, their spirit, their attitude toward the world, were considerably changed. Never again will they be exactly what they were before the war, in any of these respects. For the emergencies of war begot the new emergencies of peace, whose demands are even more imperative and far more permanent.

These demands are born of the need of what we are pleased to call the social reconstruction of the world. There is no point in arguing for the necessity of it; the world has already begun it. There is great point in defining just what it means and what part the colleges must play in it.

This social reconstruction calls upon the colleges for two reasons; first, because it requires skilled intelligence, and, second, because it requires skilled intelligence of a special sort.

First, skilled intelligence.

Any social order arises from, is sustained and refashioned by that vague but mighty thing

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called public opinion. To achieve any sound and wide-spread reform, public opinion must be practically universal; it must be efficient; and it must be intelligent. Public opinion in a democracy may be efficient without the colleges; it may become practically universal and united without them. But, without the colleges, it cannot be as intelligent as it would be with their conscientious participation and coöperative leadership. And if public opinion is not intelligent in the skilled construction of wise social purposes and in the expert means of attaining them, it is but the more unfortunate if it is universal and efficient. Unintelligent efficiency is a sorry contradiction; and it is quite prevalent.

Second, skilled intelligence of a special sort.

For the problems of social reconstruction are very special problems; problems, moreover, that happen to be the very life of men who teach and do their research in colleges. Most certainly such problems, when carefully defined, become problems of modern scientific knowledge; particularly of the knowledge embraced within what we call the social sciences; and it happens that the most conspicuous thinkers in the social sciences do their work within college

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walls. Most of the special journals for the skilled discussion of these sciences are edited by college teachers; and college teachers make up the great majority of the contributors. And, for good or ill, most of the standard books on these subjects are produced by them.

For instance, the issues of social reconstruction are issues involving an intimate and expert knowledge of economics and political science; and the experts in economics and political science are quite largely educational experts. They are problems requiring a mastery of the facts and principles of sociology, of legal philosophy, of ethics, of history, of psychology; and, once more, most of the experts in these regions happen to be college professors, whose daily business is to train the American of to-morrow in just these things.

The world cannot evade this fact. The colleges must not. It is the call of the new world-order.

Let us look forward a little.

It is the immediate task of this book to define this new obligation of our American colleges to America and to the world, not only through their valuable contributions to knowledge, but

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through their everyday education of American youth. By "colleges" is meant not only institutions that go by that name, but also the collegiate divisions of our universities as distinguished from their purely professional and technical schools,—as Harvard College is distinguished from Harvard University. And, primarily, we shall be driven to discuss the obligations of colleges as the obligations of college teachers themselves; for in their hands is placed the real guidance of the two great functions of the college,—the search for truth, on the one hand, and the imparting of truth on the other. Of course, a new world of obligation for them means a new world of obligation for the college administrator, as well as for the college student.

In referring to the new order, it will be well for us to think, first of all, of the American order; and to appreciate that our problem is primarily one of social rather than physical reconstruction. Not because the college experts in the applied physical sciences have not a stupendous work to do for American life; but because all physical rebuilding must be, at the last, in terms of social aims, or it will be worth-

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less; because the real meaning of a civilization is to be found in its social, not in its physical ideals; and because the fundamental responsibility of education is for the intangible purposes that make epochs, rather than for the matter of which they are made.

To some, it may be a surprise to find that the first reform needed is the reform of the college professor himself,—of his attitude as a teacher toward his task and toward the world. The college professor has been sufficiently conscientious always,—but in a direction which has strangely ignored obligations the most vital of all. He has been nobly loyal to truth; but he has not been sufficiently loyal to its social meaning and service. He has been a devotee of truth as the scholar sees it, which is good; but not as men need it and now in dire distress call for it. It is precisely in this attitude, which the college professor himself is beginning to suspect, that we shall find college education to be a failure, so far as it is a failure.

To redeem the college from this relative failure is the present business of educational reform. It means much constructive thinking that verges upon daring. Fundamentally, it

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means to come to a full consciousness of what we Americans really intend to make of the American order; and then to make this the supreme motive of our entire educational system,—even to the subordination of the old ideal of scholarship for its own sake; yes, and of the almost irresistible tendency toward the newer ideal of vocationalism. The true ideal is larger than either of these, and includes both. America herself, interpreted as a social order, and in living relation to world-culture, is yet to be evaluated as an adequate and inclusive educational motive.

If the problem of defining America to herself prove to be a formidable one, educators must face this very problem sooner or later and keep facing it, if American education is to be made concretely and largely efficient. Otherwise, American education, already beginning to forsake scholarship for mere materialistic efficiency, will become intrenched in irreversible decisions based upon the second-rate motives that are now clamoring for recognition. So we shall not evade this task of defining America to herself so far as this is necessary for educational purposes. In its bolder aspects, the

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problem will turn out to be not so difficult as it at first appears. But, difficult or easy, not only the college professor, but the enlightened public must speedily come to a mature realization that the chief obligation of education is to the American social order as it is and as we seek to make it.

After adjusting the college professor and his college to this new sphere of obligation, we shall want to outline rather boldly the part which the American college is to take in the refashioning of the new order, especially as expressed in a new moral consciousness and a new national and international consciousness. We shall discover a most interesting result of the discharge of this obligation,—a reaction upon the college itself that will profoundly transfigure its traditional conceptions of truth. This, in turn, will mean a revised conception of education, toward which some events, whose real significance we have neglected, have yet been inerantly tending.

The new America will not be the result of a revolution. It will be the old America come to the mature and proud consciousness of its ideals. So, the new education will be no over-

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turning of the old; it will be the lusty fruition of what is, on the whole, the best educational system the world has known.

Assuming, then, that the world has use for the colleges and their professors, how shall they proceed to their task?

II

THE ACADEMIC MIND

As soon as one seriously thinks of asking the college professor to take part in the practical business of world-building, one has second thoughts in the nature of misgivings. The college professor is gifted with a mind learned in many things; it is, perhaps, a wholly willing mind; it is a good mind, a very good mind in its place. But the world distrusts it, sometimes ridicules it, often caricatures it; and ever deems it highly impractical and, all in all, useless for its sterner purposes.

And, finally, the worldly-wise damn it by calling it the "academic mind."

Just what do the worldly-wise mean by the academic mind,—the mind with which college professors are supposed to be afflicted?

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In its modern and most virulent form, it is partly the result of the specialization in learning that has been going on increasingly during the last half century. Some of us remember a time when a single professor taught physics, chemistry, geology, botany, and other scientific subjects under the license he held as a professor of science in general. To-day, there are no professors of science in general. Physics, chemistry, and the other numerous subjects of scientific teaching are allotted to specialists in these several fields. A modern geologist may know little about chemistry; a physicist may know little or nothing about botany. This specialization has taken place not only in the natural sciences, but in every other region of learning and research.

All this is good, very good, so far as it goes. But note that out of it has emerged a by-product, known to our keener critics as the academic mind. And since these critics may be right, let us see exactly what it is. For the time, then, we may as well imagine ourselves allied with them, speaking freely as they speak, and with a measure of unsympathetic hostility.

Not every college professor has the academic

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mind; and when he has it, he is usually conscious of it as his professional mind, quite separate from his everyday human living. He who has it tends to show at least some of the following alarming symptoms in varying degrees.

First of all, he is absorbed in learning for learning's sake; and, for him, learning means his own special field. The natural result of this is that he tends, gradually but surely, to ignore the relation of his subject to other subjects. He becomes, perforce, a provincial, not in the geography of space, but in the geography of interests. For instance, the larger educational problems of his college, such as curriculum-thinking and planning—for which he is coöperatively responsible—he is prone to leave to educational administrators. He is, on the whole, somewhat indifferent to educational reforms, save as they molest his subject. Thus to abstract his subject from other subjects is deadly enough; but he creates another abstraction far more significant,—the abstraction of his subject from practical human needs. In this sense, he is as dead to the world as any medieval brother of the cloisters. In assuming his vows to science instead of to religion, he has yet, in

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effect, taken orders and has become not only an intellectual provincial, but an intellectual monastic. He is, indeed, rather proud of this isolation from all utilitarian considerations, spiritual and material, as though it were an achievement; and he dignifies it by calling it "the scientific point of view."

The academically minded, thus comfortably circumscribed, yea, sacrosanct, burning the white flame of his devotion upon the altar of his Subject, is fortunate indeed if he does not attain some of the more arrant virtues of the pedant, even while crying anathema upon pedantry in others. Not feeling social responsibility very keenly, he tends to become self-centered. Daily face to face with that region of truth most worth while, he tends to achieve that most insidious of all humilities, the paradoxical humility of the self-complacent. For the monopolizing demands of his subject upon him gradually and imperceptibly breed in him like monopolizing demands upon others. Indeed, among his colleagues, he is sometimes discovered capable of the petty jealousies of the egotist.

He is not an extremely good listener to men in

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other fields; and when he listens to men in his own field, it is likely to be with an ever-growing refutation in his mind,—which begets a surprising sort of mental deafness. As a conversationalist, he would be astonished if he knew how often he uses the first personal pronoun. Secure in his field, but secure nowhere else, he tends to discuss most things, kings and lovers and gods, from its special vantage; or he cultivates an inbreeding silence that sometimes passes for depth; or surprises one with his child-like ignorance of the common experiences and attitudes of common men.

Since a genuine sense of humor is born of a liberal perspective, the academic mind is not unlikely to lack humor, save, occasionally, within its own restricted field; and then it is not much more convincing to other academic minds than the humor fond parents find in the unexampled achievements of their own unique offspring. Often when the academic mind ventures to laugh down “absurdities” lying beyond its own familiar region, the joke is on itself and its lack of acquaintance with detail gladly alien.

When academic minds debate a serious problem, they forthwith reduce it to abstractions,

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It transforms itself into what we are familiar with as a purely "academic question," which gives rise to what we know as an "academic discussion." Such a discussion is not supposed to arrive anywhere in particular. Abstract ghost fights abstract ghost; phantom qualifications thrust and parry with phantoms of their kind; definitions joust with definitions, until the opposing minds are wearied and retire with their unvanquished armies. Thus, the academic mind is more apt to debate what an abstraction called justice is than what is a just society of human beings, under definite and real conditions; more likely to talk about ideation and volition than about ideas and deeds. It defines hedonism, rather than the happy man; freedom, rather than a free soul or a free state. It insists upon separating things that can be only distinguished, not separated, such as goodness and happiness; and loves to talk about things "as such," when there is nothing that exists in heaven or earth "as such."

As a natural result of its constant business of refined and accurate analysis, the academic mind tends to become almost painfully literal and empty of imagination. Considering the

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ideals for which it lives, the imagination is in the nature of a temptation to be resisted,—a siren that seduces from the straight and narrow way to the gates of truth. Much, indeed, has been said in praise of the scientific imagination; but it is the imagination of abstractions, not of images. Properly speaking, it is not imagination at all; it is logical construction of concepts, an ability of a very high order. The academic mind dislikes metaphors and is suspicious of similes. It appreciates the flowers of literature only as it can dissect them. Now, in literature, as in any art, to dissect is to destroy. Thus, the academic mind, in teaching literature, tends to kill the dream and slay the dreamer. So literary departments in colleges rarely stimulate creators; the academic mind is there, to make academic minds of them. If these shall create, their most triumphant creation is not something new, unless it be a new analysis and evaluation of what is old.

Discouraging the imagination as wayward, with a whole world of desires unexplored, the academic mind is apt to lack a certain healthy playfulness. Esteeming reason at the expense of imagination, valuing the true at the expense

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of the beautiful, it is not unlikely to become un-aesthetic, even slovenly, in its modes of expression,—its clothes, its manners, its walk, its speech.

It is a matter of course that the habits of the academic mind should make it the creator of difficulties in the way of most reforms or policies of action. For by long training it is circumspect, with a pride of judicial mindedness; conservative, with little of the spirit of adventure; critical enough of the god of things as they are, but abundantly suspicious of any other god as an interloper. Vulgarly, the academic mind never “skids” or breaks the speed laws. To it, nothing is ever really “a matter of life and death.”

Finally, having built its city upon the level plateau of reason, the academic mind shuns the heights and depths of feeling. It avoids inconsiderate enthusiasms; and for it all enthusiasms tend to be inconsiderate, save the pale enthusiasm for its subject, which is not communicable and which it is vulgar to attempt to communicate. Emphatically, one must not be a propagandist. Enthusiasms are for the heart, not for the head; for the world, not for the

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scholar. The enthusiasms of to-day are the by-words of to-morrow; but truth lives forever.

So the speech of the academic mind is never emotional, never fluent with the meltings of a divine fire. Indeed, to be fluent of speech is to be suspected of shallowness of thought. A very definite sort of academic speech has sprung up, fitted to the expression of the contents of the academic mind. Everyone who is acquainted with the oral discussions of us college professors knows it. It is halting; it retraces its steps and begins again; it labors like Sisyphus with the burden of its concept; it is filled with sundry "as-it-weres," "be-that-as-it-mays," and "howevers" and with many an "as-such" and "in-other-words" and "in-a-sense"; it is punctuated by frequent hesitating "uhs," as "the theory-uh of the author-uh," impeding the march of words as the blind alleys of hell impede lost souls; it is parenthetical with clogging qualifications and bracketed provisos; its commas are dashes, its periods tentative. The body of Caesar is dead; and this Anthony has come, not to avenge Caesar, nay, not to bury him, but to dissect him. (The academic mind would never die upon a cross; not because it

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would be unwilling, but because it could never inspire enough enthusiasm to get the deed done.

Such, it is maliciously alleged, are some of the tendencies of the academic mind,—exemplified (it is further alleged) at their very best in the average college faculty meeting, where the academic abstractness, literalness, conservatism, obstructionism, and mode of speech find a forum fully adapted to their glorified expression.

It is not to be expected that college professors will accept this account as true; but they may be grateful for it as a rough delineation of some of the characteristics of their colleagues. After all, the question is not whether it is a caricature, but whether it is a passable one. A caricature has its uses. Its purpose is selective emphasis—selective distortion, if you please—of features that shall yet remain recognizable. Perhaps the above bold sketch is such a selective distortion. If so, it will serve to bring to forcible attention certain tendencies in the mind of the college teacher that must be kept before us, if we are to define his function and the function of his college in to-day's world.

III

THE DEFENSE OF THE ACADEMIC MIND

BUT first, we college teachers, even though admitting a measure of truth in our hostile critics' contentions, have the right to indulge in a word of protest and defense.

Suppose it to be true that the academic mind (using the epithet of our critics) is a logical result of specialization in learning. Very well; is it not equally true that through this same specialization all our modern progress in knowledge has been made? And it is inconceivable that this progress could have been made in any other way. To abolish the specialist is to abolish every modern science; for every modern science is a specialization.

Let us go even further than our critics and maintain that many of the attributes alleged against us are not merely by-products of spe-

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cialization, but are absolutely necessary that specialization may be efficient. Within the tasks which call for them, they are not vices to be condemned, but virtues to be cultivated. Indeed, let us not only admit but insist that, as educators, it is an important part of our business to produce these same traits in our students. We do this that the search for truth may go on under the only conditions that make the search successful.

Let us make this clear.

If we isolate our subject from other subjects, it is because we do not choose to be smatterers. If to keep within our proper province is to be "provincial," it is a provincialism highly worth while. To cross the boundary line and to dabble in other subjects seems to us dispersion of attention and useless presumption. We cannot be experts in a variety of fields. And the world needs experts.

If we separate our special pursuits from all thoughts of utility, it is because our experience proves that truth is best served by seeking it for its own sake, no matter where it leads. Otherwise, the search for truth would tend to be merely prudential, and motivated only by the

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immediate clamor of the times; born of demands that are transitory and conflicting and partial, and usually of the grosser sort. We seek the whole of truth, with the faith that all truth is worth while and that it will be of genuine use to our fellowmen sometime, if not at this moment. This is, we admit, "the scientific point of view." Ridicule it, if you desire. It takes courage to be loyal to it, unswayed by merely personal interests, or by the rewards of wealth or fame. If this is to be other-worldly and "monastic," we ask no man to take the vows of such a devotion unless he deems truth of enough value to sacrifice for it much that is human and pleasant.

If we reduce all serious problems to what seem unreal and empty abstractions, we do it because it happens that no problem in heaven or earth can be solved, or even become an intelligible problem at all, without reducing it to abstractions,—yes, to distinctions which do not exist as real separations in the concrete world. This means merely that no problem can be stated or solved without an analysis of it into parts, each part being neither more nor less than an abstracted part.

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Take the commonest everyday practical problem, say the problem of furnishing wall-paper for a given wall. The problem at once reduces itself to the consideration of such unreal elements as a plane surface, abstracted from three dimensions; length and breadth, abstracted from each other. For the moment, while measuring, one is simply compelled to consider the wall "as such," abstracted from its own thickness and from the ceiling and the floor; length "as such"; then breadth "as such," although we well know that there is no such thing in the world as a wall "as such," or length or breadth "as such." So with any other problem involving geometry,—it deals with abstractions and nothing but abstractions. And geometry—yes, all of mathematics—is valuable, not in spite of dealing with abstractions, but because it is able to do so and is loyal to the abstractions it makes.

Again, if, during any conversation, I wish to determine whether my friend's argument is sound, I must, at once, abstract his reasons from his disposition, his temper, his manner of speech, and from my own affection for him and my like or dislike of his attitude toward me

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or toward his subject. Then, as a logician, I must analyze his argument into its parts. In doing this, I am perfectly aware that there never was a train of reasoning "as such," apart from feelings; or terms, or premises, or conclusions "as such." So it is with any problem of logic; its tools are abstractions and nothing but abstractions. And logic is of worth not in spite of its abstractions, but precisely because of them.

Now, all the abstractions to which the academic mind reduces the world's problems are abstractions of exactly these ordinary and familiar sorts; carried much further, it is true, as the problems become more intricate, but still not different in kind from what the man in the street creates every time he solves a problem. What begets the suspicion of the man in the street is not that the abstractions of the academic mind are really different from his own in kind, but that they are so greatly refined that they seem empty, irrelevant, and unreal.

But, after all, no abstraction seems unreal if one intimately realizes the problem to be solved by it. Then it is, for the moment, and rightfully, the supreme reality. As Royce puts

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it, "no distinction is ever too subtle for you, at the moment when it occurs to you to make that distinction for yourself, and not merely to hear that somebody else has made it. And no abstraction seems to you too airy in the hour when you rise upon your own wings to the region where just that abstraction happens to be an element in the concrete fullness of your thoughtful life."*

Do away with these so-called airy abstractions, and you do away with not only mathematics and logic, but every one of the sciences. Chemistry deals with only one abstracted aspect of our world, the chemical aspect; surely, everyone can see that no concrete object in the world about us is a merely chemical object. It is also an object for physics, for esthetics; perhaps for geology; or for biology and anatomy and physiology; it may be for even sociology and psychology as well,—as, for instance, the chemist himself. The chemist's wife's tear has other meanings besides chemical meanings: yet, for this reason shall we consider chemistry worthless?

So with any other science. It not only ab-

* Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 8.

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stracts one single aspect of the world, or a small group of them, for its own attention, but, within this circumscribed field, it makes further abstractions. Otherwise, it would have no problems, no experiments and no results.

One should add that this power to think in terms of abstractions is of use not only in science. Even outside his science, this habit of the academic mind is valuable when brought to bear upon the great practical issues of the world at large. For, with the aid of its abstractions, the academic mind often is able to make important discriminations that have practical value and which the unscientific mind ignores at the risk of injury to his cause.

It is easy to conceive that the discussions of us academic minds, including this very discussion, seem futile and even irritating to an observer. It is true that such discussions seldom arrive anywhere in particular. But, after all, we never expect to solve a real problem in the course of a conversation or even in a series of them. No, our problems are finally solved in the silent rigid tests of devious thought and crucial experiment. Our debates are leisurely exchanges of views, not hasty hunts for con-

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clusions; they are the thrusts and parries that clear up issues, rather than the decisive battles that settle them.

And truly we do arrive somewhere in particular, or all our faith in science is in vain.

Does the academic mind seem ultra-conservative and obstructive? Well, there was a time when the minds of men were not conservative, not particularly circumspect in their search for truth; when they were uncritical of their methods,—dogmatic, credulous, makers of hasty generalizations. In those days, science made no progress worth recording.

It was out of the realization of the hopeless futility of such uncritical procedure that modern scientific method was born. And the soul of modern scientific method is caution,—infinitely patient caution. The modern scientific mind is, perforce, a conservative mind, a circumspect mind, a testing, sifting mind, suspicious of new truths until they are proved; and, for the sake of testing their pretensions, ready to put all negative arguments in their way, well knowing that if their claims to verity be well founded, they will emerge triumphant. In their triumph, no one will be gladder than the scien-

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tist; for his challenge to pretended truths is not born of any enmity to change and progress, but of his concern for truth's sacred interests. No one would say that the sentry who cries "Halt!" to an approaching soldier, even though that soldier later prove to be a friend, is thereby an enemy of the army he guards. The academic minds are, if you please, sentries at the outposts of truth. For the ordinary, everyday concerns of life, their professional caution would be indeed absurd. But for their special business it is necessary; and it would be a dereliction to forget it for one instant. The world trusts them to do this business for it conscientiously and well, and it quite implicitly accepts their announced results as authoritative.

Conservative? Obstructive? Of scientific doubt was born scientific thinking, whose very methods are the frank codifications of the laws of conservatism. And, since this scientific conservatism came into being, science has progressed farther than during all the preceding history of man's search for the meanings of his perplexing world.

Again, to criticize the academic mind for its literalness, its lack of imagination,—is it not a

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little like blaming a carpenter for using a saw instead of a sword? Each is excellent in its place; but let the soldier and the carpenter each have his own. Now, the special weapon of the truth-seeker is cold, hard, logical reason. It is constructive; but it is not the constructive imagination of the poet. The first law of motion is dry and literal enough; it would be hard to make a poem out of it; but neither can you extract the law of gravitation out of the divine *afflatus* of a poet, even though he be born in Henley Street. If it is an error to be literal, then truth itself is in error, for truth is always literal,—the literal truth.

Yet it does sometimes happen that the imagination comes upon the revelation of a great truth, boldly, grandly, and in a way that ever lives as a heroic episode. But such revelations are rare. They are accidental; and when they occur, they must be tested and put into form by the literal reason of the scientific mind, whose work is prosaic, but sure; to whom the sensuous imagination is not an aid, but a hindrance. The service of truth by reason is as sacred as the service of beauty by the imagination. The academic mind guesses that the two

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may be one service, when all is known; but he knows that it is not the same service here and now. He is certain that, hard as it may be for his soul, his is not the winding, woodland road, but the straight and stony trail that leads "where no birds sing."

But what makes us academic minds seem most condemnable, unhuman, and uncompanionable to most men is that, as our critics allege, we tend to be somewhat aloof from the enthusiasms of the world about us. We are devoid of demonstrativeness, of feeling. We not only live the life of reason, but it is a reason barren of human emotions.

We will have to admit that much of this is true; and, we add, necessarily true, considering the nature of our tasks. Surely, you would not have us swayed by our feelings in our search for truth? Come, now, shall our conclusions be determined by feelings of pleasure, or pain, or fear, or anger, or ambition? Shall we, for instance, believe only what makes us feel happy, and deny all that makes us feel unhappy? Shall we biologists come to you and say that the truth we bring you is not the result of reason and test and experiment, but was determined partly

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by our feelings of delight or of dread? No, reason, to be serviceable, must indeed be calm and cold. One may, at times, attain truth through "hunches"; but it is parlous to rely upon them. Strong feelings are as bad for the academic reason as a magnetic storm is for the traditional compass of the navigator.

But, our critics may say, after your truth is once found, it might well arouse some human feeling in you. After it is safely proved, you might at least enunciate it with some enthusiasm. After all, that is the main business of most of you college professors,—not to create new truth, but to communicate it to your students and to the world at large. But your tomes are dreary and your lectures uninspired. And your speech is, as we have said, halting, tentative, and often void of the commonest amenities of rhetoric.

Well, it may be an unfortunate result of our training; but, at any rate, I suppose that we instinctively avoid any mode of speech that appears like propaganda, partly because we fear that it may seem a sort of immodest partisanship, a kind of special pleading for what our labors have produced; partly because we do

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not want to cheapen truth; partly because emotional speech would impede the calm judgment of those to whom we appeal, and whom we do not desire to sway, but to awake to judicious thinking; and, finally, because we believe that worthy truth conveys itself to those who are worthy of it by its own force and merit, rather than by any undue persuasion. If our speech is difficult and arid and unspectacular, so is the road each man must take to win the greater verities. Take our speech, if you will, as a sort of allegory of the devious and painstaking ways we ourselves had to tread to reach the treasures we now try to share with men.

As for our other shortcomings, they are simply undesirable results of our occupation. We would like to mend them, as the sailor might like to mend his walk. We make fun of each other for just these shortcomings. We do not think that they interfere greatly with our main business. They simply make us the butt of ridicule for the more cosmopolitan man of the world, whom, we may as well confess, we often envy.

This, then, is the defense of the academic mind. All the significant attributes condemned

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in it now stand revealed as not only pardonable but praiseworthy, if we but remember one cardinal thing,—that its business in life is just the search for truth and its expression,—not the creation of the beautiful, not great passions, not heroic deeds. Its only passion is the passion for its search; its only deeds are thoughts.

The college teacher has been attacked; and the college teacher has been vindicated. What more is there to say?

There is much more to say, if the American college is to adjust itself successfully to the new America.

IV

THE OBLIGATION TO THE SOCIAL ORDER

THE search for truth for its own sake has its honorable place in the world. For the college professor, it is an obligation. Let us call it his Academic Obligation. If he is true to nothing else, he must be true to this. And he must keep his devotion to the truth of his science free from the world, unswerved by its utilitarian criticisms. There is and always will be an important place in colleges for that kind of research which is in the service of science "as such."

But the college professor is also a man among men. He is an intimate and very human unit of the living society of his time. Like other men, he eats and sleeps, marries, has children and a home, votes, pays his taxes, belongs to

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clubs, plays golf, goes to church, and otherwise lives the normal life of the ordinary citizen. Within this human everyday world also, the college professor has duties which he does not hesitate to recognize. These are his Everyday Obligations. One need not enlarge upon them. There is no question about them.

Furthermore, just as, for the interests of his academic pursuits, he keeps them isolated from worldly concerns; so, for the happiness of his wife and children and friends, as well as for his efficiency as a citizen, he would best not intrude his academic points of view into his everyday life. The college professor becomes insufferable if he insists upon talking "shop" there. It may be that this was a decisive reason why the Athenian public became weary of Socrates and why he did not get along well with Xantippe.

But shall the college professor recognize no relation at all between the region of his academic interests and the world of his everyday life? Does the first contribute nothing to the second?

It does. The contribution should be great and vital; and it is one of the primary concerns of

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the college professor to see that the contribution is made efficient. For there is a third sphere of obligation, upon the recognition of which depends the efficiency of the college, in its discharge of a distinct and unique duty to civilization; particularly to the social reconstruction now so imperatively the call of the new world-order. In very fact, it is because of the attitude of the college professor toward this third sphere of obligation that the traditional criticisms of the academic mind arise and are richly deserved.

Let us call this third sphere of obligation the Obligation to the Social Order. It is very important to make clear at once what we shall mean by it, for it is the presupposition of all sound educational reform. And there is no better way than a way academic minds often adopt,—to hazard, first, a definition, and then to explain it.

Here is the definition:

By the Obligation to the Social Order is meant the obligation of academic experts to use their special knowledge to its utmost to solve the more pressing concrete social problems of the day, and to teach others to solve them, They are

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to do this as a business, not as a side issue. They are to do it themselves. They are not to do it from their customary academic motives; nor are they to test their results by merely academic reasons. No, here their motives and tests must include the fundamental values men cherish as men and fight for as civilization. Applied to America, this means that the American college exists for the American social order, first as a fact, but most as an ideal, with its international and intercultural implications.

And now for an illustration of what the discharge of this obligation would mean:

Suppose one happens to be a professor of philosophy. Academically, it is his business to be erudite in the philosophical systems of history. He must know the typical philosophic problems and their typical solutions; and (if he is either very young or very old) he will quite likely have constructed a philosophic system of his own. All this belongs to him as a seeker for truth as such. It is his Academic Obligation.

His Everyday Obligations do not differ essentially from the everyday life of the average educated man. It is fairly distinct from his academic interests.

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His Obligation to the Social Order he may or may not recognize. What can he achieve when he does recognize it efficiently?

He can achieve many things. He can interpret the philosophical implications of the actual social order in which he lives, its popular attitudes, acclaims, and decisions. There are such things as idealism, materialism, and mysticism not only in the philosophical systems he academically teaches, but in the concrete life of the common men about him. Yes, that is the point. They are harder to find here; they are never pure, but they are intensely real, and it is just as significant to find them here,—more significant for the world of men he serves. Why? Because their sure social progress is to be obtained only by a thorough self-consciousness of what their own civilization really means. Such self-consciousness is the first condition of all rational human growth. The philosopher has something indispensable to contribute to it, or his theories are empty and his vision blind.

Or, our same academic philosopher is an ethical theorist. Well, an ethical interpretation of the times, say the recent war, or the American conscience, by one skillful with ethical

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concepts is the opportunity and manifest duty of those who can do it. The strictly academic business of the ethical theorist may be simply ethical theory. But in the world of events and as a teacher, he can and should apply and interpret sharply defined ideals, as a man expertly concerned with great issues. Here, he must throw off, in a measure, the academic limitations surrounding him as a man of research.

So with the psychologist, or the economist, or the sociologist, or the political scientist, or any other specialist; his learning has potential meanings in a very real obligation to the social order.

Now, it should be made clear that the social order is not a matter of choice, or merely an inviting opportunity for the academic mind; it is exactly what we have called it, an *obligation*, —an obligation binding upon every college teacher who has vision for the real significance of both science and education. Science has larger responsibilities than those she owes to herself. What civilization fights for is the object of no experimental laboratory. No army would die for a chemical formula, or for a law of psychology. Yet, all social advance is aided

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through adaptations of just such knowledge; the more expert the knowledge, the surer the advance. And the special kind of knowledge indispensable for such progress is the knowledge in the possession of college and university scientists.

Surely, as a human being, the admitted moral responsibilities of such a scientist reach to every phase of his power to achieve such service. To the limits of such power, he will seek to interpret and help set on the way of progress those regions of the concrete life of man and society to which his science, when considered "as such," only abstractly refers. He will ask what he, not as a pure scientist, but as a man who is also master of a science, can do for civilization.

Without recognition of this obligation to society and the state (which make his researches possible) the professor and his college tend to become at least unmoral. Indeed, is it too harsh to say that a wilful blindness to the needs of his age and a cynical indifference to the practical bearings of educational truth mean an overt breach of duty?

But if the obligation to the social order never before made an imperative call upon scholars,

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it makes that call now, when social reconstruction demands the ultimate resourcefulness of every man. Even such an abstract being as God came down to life with the war, through the new religious consciousness of all peoples. No academic question is so high and important at this time that it will absolve the conscience and the abilities of any man from responding to the pressing needs of the hour.

Nor may the specialist in the social sciences continue to hand over these responsibilities to a special group of men other than themselves, —a special group of "applied" social scientists. If the body of knowledge embraced in the social sciences is to be rendered most of value to the world of concrete life, the experts themselves are best equipped to transform it into that value. Only the academic mind knows enough to put its abstractions together again! Grave problems affecting the whole structure of society have been left to others than the experts before. The result has frequently been a misinterpretation of science's true pronouncements on the subjects involved, often delay, and sometimes downright catastrophe. Another reason is just as important. It has been already

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hinted that the recognition of his obligations to the social order by the scientist himself means a revision of his notion of educational truth, and so of his attitude toward his subject; above all, a new view of college education and of his part in it. So, not only does the social order need the academic mind, but the academic mind, in turn, needs the social order for the tremendous value of its reaction upon the college of to-morrow.

This, then, is the Obligation to the Social Order. The college professor must recognize it in two ways,—first, by grappling with its problems himself; and second, by teaching American youth to grapple with them. The second way is just as important as the first. For it is the supreme business of the college to achieve this very thing. Otherwise, it has finally closed its gates on life.

V

THE FAILURE OF THE ACADEMIC MIND

BUT in all this, is there anything new? Has not the scientist long recognized the obligations of himself and of his science to the problems of the world at large? Is not the increasing prestige of the vocational sciences in education and in life sufficient evidence of this? Further, the experts of the college are found more and more in public life. They hold important public offices; are heard of on public commissions, in organized movements for civic and social betterment. We have all kinds of applied psychology, from educational psychology to the psychology of advertising and salesmanship. The journals of political science, economics, and sociology present not a few articles by college professors on vital problems of the day, as their subjects touch them.

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In answer to this, it is pertinent to say, first of all, that we are not here concerned with whether the applied or vocational sciences are discharging their obligations to civilization. On the whole, they are. They are, in their very nature, in close contact with concrete life. But their work is only secondarily that of social reconstruction. It is with the social sciences that we are here concerned, and with the strictly educational uses of the pure physical sciences. And first, it should be made clear that while a conspicuous few teachers of such sciences do recognize the obligation to the social order, the great majority do not; or they do not recognize it sufficiently, and as a primary moral responsibility. That the living application of the social sciences should be behind that of the physical sciences is partly because the spiritual needs of men are not so clamorous or so immediately pressing as the material needs that the physical sciences serve; partly because of the elusiveness and complexity of the problems involved; partly because the social sciences conceive themselves less advanced and more tentative in their conclusions. But whatever the reason, when the social sciences do assume the obligation to the

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social order, they tend to do so in a haphazard way, and without full consciousness of its import. And the pure physical sciences, as such, rarely perceive such an obligation at all.

What is most serious is that, when the scientist does assume world-obligations, he tends to do so as an academic mind. He insists upon carrying his beloved abstractions into that sphere as though they were realities. He tends, thus, not only to nullify his efforts, but to do positive injury to the causes he seeks to serve. If, within the uses of its own realm, the criticisms of the academic mind were captious and the result of misapprehension, here, in the region of its obligations to the social order, they are abundantly justified.

For the supreme fallacy of the academic mind is carefully to make abstractions; and then, straightway, to forget that they are abstractions. The fault is not to think academically; but to think academically and not to know it. Many natural scientists seem thoroughly unaware that, in dealing with abstracted aspects of reality, they are dealing with the intangible and the unreal. The social scientist often commits the same fallacy.

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For instance, academically, it is perfectly correct, because logical, for a philosopher to classify people into those who are pleasure-seekers and those who do right for right's sake, and so on; or, for a political scientist to classify governments as democracies, autocracies, and the like. But real people are never mere pleasure-seekers; nor does a concrete person, John Smith, always do right for right's sake. Neither is any given government a democracy, snugly fitting within any logical definition one can conceive,—whatever its ideals may be. Yet, it is the tendency of the academic mind to treat actual people and governments and other entities of our real world as if they were just these sorts of other-worldly things.

But no concrete problem can be advantageously interpreted or solved on this basis. The academic mind will surely fail if it attempts it. All that it will succeed in doing is to solve the problems of a hypothetical world that never was and that never can be; or to glean new abstractions; or, at best, illustrations of them, to put into new theses that shall appear as new products of academic research.

Or, to give another instance of what is very

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common and still more specious: The expert in the conceptions belonging to one field of knowledge legitimately solves the problems of that field in their terms. But sometimes he forgets that these are very special and limited notions of truth, applicable only to that one field. He ignores that his science is only one abstracted aspect of concrete life, separated from other aspects of life only for the sake of the specialization of labor. Ignoring this, he attempts to solve the problems of other fields with his own field's special concepts. Thus, a biologist sometimes endeavors to reduce all psychology to biological concepts; or an economist to reduce all moral values to the special values of the economic world. This tendency is at its extreme when, as is often the case, a scientist essays to solve all concrete world-problems in terms of his own abstracted science; as when a Spencer applies the principles of biological evolution to the inorganic and spiritual worlds, not metaphorically, but literally. Or, when a Haeckel solves the riddle of the universe, including God, the soul, and immortality, by the notions of biology. This can be done so adroitly that the world, unfamiliar with the meaning

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and limitations of the ideas used, may be temporarily convinced. It is in this way that the defects of the academic mind frequently have permeated the world order, under the honest pretension of giving mankind a new enlightenment. But if the excursion of the academic mind has been into the realm of the more common concerns of life, the result is such that the worldly-wise find in it only one more instance of the inefficiency of the academically minded in general, and of the college professor in particular.

It is this trait of carrying his abstractions, unchanged, into the world of events that gives rise to most of the criticisms of the academic mind as impractical, provincial, other-worldly, unimaginative, and, on the whole, inefficient, when outside its own restricted sphere. It is this infirmity that begets the stage version of the long-haired, helpless college professor, with his abundant naïveté and childlike unsophistication. It is the meaning of the distrust which many people had of "Professor" Wilson at the beginning of his administration as President of the United States; and which he had to live down by practical successes in dealing with

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practical issues; and by proving that he was a human being after all, with a vision larger than that of the mere college professor. I hope to show that it is this defect of the academic mind which is at the bottom of nearly all of the typical shortcomings of college education today. It is the secret of the inefficiency of many of our college graduates, who must be unacademicized in some measure before they can accomplish much in meeting real problems with their recently acquired learning.

Let us next look at college education as the academic mind achieves it,

VI

HOW COLLEGE PROFESSORS EDUCATE

THE failure of the academic mind is the failure of college education. College education should be conceived to be primarily an obligation to the social order; the college teacher thinks of it as part of his merely academic obligation. His educational use of the social sciences is academic; of the physical sciences is academic; of languages and literatures is academic. It is much nearer his function of research than the function of fitting for life; nearer the purpose of creating more academic specialists than the purpose of creating efficient citizens,—yet, paradoxically enough, attaining neither!

Let us see if this is so. Let us see how the traits of the academic mind, invaluable for the

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research type of truth, are yet intruded into the educational uses of learning; how, through such uses, these traits transform themselves into faults, and attain a product quite anomalous.

Try to understand this product fairly,—the mind of the typical college graduate, approved and sealed with a typical bachelor's degree. What has he learned? Some of the elements of the social sciences, most probably, history and economics; some foreign languages, with an emphasis upon the modern; some physical sciences, chiefly chosen from physics, chemistry, and zoölogy; some English composition and literature; some mathematics; and a few other scattered subjects. The relative stress upon these general fields is likely to be in the order in which I have mentioned them. Probably the western college graduate has had more of the natural sciences and less of the languages than the eastern. But, taking it all in all, college men all over America emerge with sufficiently similar acquisitions in learning, and even culture. One may discuss them fairly as a common type, with very definite common traits.

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The worth of just these subjects and their relative emphasis must be appraised. But it is important to discover not merely what subjects our graduate has studied, but in what sense he has studied them; not merely what he has learned, but his attitude toward that learning; and, further, the kinds of uses he tends to make of it. The answer spells culture or the reverse; it means wisdom or folly. For, as everyone knows, culture is not the mere learning of high things, but the passion for them; and wisdom is not knowledge, but knowledge transfigured by life and for life. Education is either both, or it is—academic.

It is academic. During his four years, our college graduate learns the two great abstractions of his teachers: the abstraction of scholarly interests from each other; and the abstraction of scholarly interests from life. No complaint would be in order if this were merely one stage in his education. For it is a necessary step in all learning; analysis precedes intelligent synthesis. One must first take the watch apart before he can learn to put it together. But what if abstract analysis culminate in nothing further? What if the sundered sides

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of reality represented by the various special sciences never get put together again in the student's mind? What if, say, economics on the one hand and ethics on the other; or political science and sociology; or the humanities and the physical sciences,—what if these are separated not only tentatively, for temporary convenience and efficiency, but are never reunited, as life insists that they shall be united?

But that is exactly what happens.

Even within a special group of sciences of the same kind, the sundering continues without end. For example, the student studies the various social sciences. Presumably, these are sciences about a very concrete thing called Society. But where and when does the student learn of that living Society, of which each social science presents only one limited aspect? True, he learns of the economic side of society; of the sociological side, the political side, the ethical side; but rarely of that Society which is all of these things, and so no one of just these things alone. This is no more education than an unorganized miscellany of vital organs would be a living body. For the real problems and issues of Society, the things men fight

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for as democracy, are never merely economic, or anthropological, or political, or ethical. They are the human syntheses of all these partial things. Is there no place in colleges for these problems? When do social scientists get together to correlate their functions and results? To what would they be correlated, if they did meet?

Even languages are likely to be taught "as such," are certainly given credit for as such; not as leading to the mastery of the articulate thought to which the languages are the means, or even to philological uses, save the most casual. A language abstracted from its literature! Or from the power to speak it! Or, to understand it when it is spoken! But it is so many units toward a degree! Or suppose the literature is taught, how is it likely to be taught? Again the tendency toward infinite analysis without the infinite synthesis. Is it our very own literature? Hamlet! The student is likely to get the style in which Hamlet is written; the sources of Hamlet; the dramaturgy of Hamlet; the historical setting of Hamlet; the grammar of Hamlet; the etymology of Hamlet; but rarely Hamlet himself, rarely the

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divine contagion. Many teachers would deny that there is any such thing.

The encouraging fact is that in the department of English in most of our larger colleges there is likely to be at least one man who sees this and regrets it.

All conceivable ways and means in the hands of modern education tend to make this analytic stage in learning the goal of learning; to make the merely tentative the final; to make the unreal the real. The necessary narrow specialization of teachers helps it. Stressing the conditions of graduation as a mere amassing of credit for a certain number of hours spent in the class-room helps it. Our tests of the proficiency of the student help it,—tests that come immediately after each course he takes, as just this special course, which may safely be forgotten now that the grade is finally recorded; tests that never hold the student to an intelligent organization of the fields of learning in relation to one another. Our strange lack of special correlation courses aids it,—courses that could be invented to bring together, for perspective's sake, the various special and narrow fields of learning which the student is ex-

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ploring. The elective system tends to foster this same unreal education. And it is encouraged by the loose interpretation of most "group systems," notwithstanding that they are supposed to ameliorate the evils of too much freedom in the choice of studies. Finally, the absolute consonance of this notion of education with the professional interests of the college teacher intrenches it and renders it almost unchangeable.

But, as was said, the college graduate attains not only one, but two great modern abstractions. Not only the abstraction of subjects from one another, but the abstraction of all of them from life. These are but two distinct sides of the same thing. Each aggravates the other. For subjects become sundered not only for the convenience of specialists, but because of the ignoring of the one great thing that could organize them,—the larger purposes of a living world. And these purposes are slighted, in turn, because academic interest in subjects of education stop at life's portals.

For, even in his teaching, it is scholarship rather than the institutions of life that the college teacher is absorbed in, yes, in spite of him-

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self. The whole educational tradition, and particularly his training as a specialist, makes this inevitable. It is not that the college teacher consciously says to himself, "I will now teach with the aim of making my students into scholars." As a matter of fact, there is a general absence of conscious educational ideals for the student, save among administrators. The political ideal of education, for instance, sometimes characterized as "education for democracy," or "education for citizenship," is but feebly present in our college faculties, save, perhaps, when their members travel forth to deliver commencement addresses. The ideal of "efficiency" is prevalent mostly in professional and technical schools; or in the general emphasis upon a liberal education as an efficient introduction to these. No, the ideal of scholarship for its own sake and of preparation for research is the predominant ideal,—not explicitly conscious, but grimly and thoroughly real. Grades and prizes, Phi Beta Kappa keys and scholarships are given in the service of it. Education goes on as if the aim of life were the sort of abstract contemplation that some philosophers interpret as the occupation of

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Aristotle's God. Educators frankly plead for pure science as the highest type of thought, for the humanities as such, for "disinterested thinking," and lament the encroachments of the applications of learning as a sacrilege upon truth's sacred rights.

Nothing has yet been said about the choice of subjects which comprise the average undergraduate's curriculum; only the manner of their teaching has been considered,—a manner born of the scholarship motif. But why just these subjects? Is there any real reason except they are the most conspicuous subjects in which scholars happen to be interested? Is there any other key to the curriculum, such as it is? True, there is some degree of compliance with the demands of the social order, especially through the pressure upon the college of the professional and the technical schools. But, after all, scholarship being the supreme thing, and scholarship meaning to each professor the special learning of his own field, there is little curriculum-thinking. We may have one reason for including mathematics among the things the student must master; and another, perhaps a wholly contradictory reason, for including po-

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litical science; but no one reason or ideal that might create a unified curriculum. The chief proof of this is the almost incredible variety of ways by which the American college student may obtain the same degree. The subjects a college man studies are like the heaps of bricks and stones and mortar and lumber of an unbegun building; nay, are they even this? Are there here materials of the sort that could be assembled into any building whatsoever,—temple or palace or hut? Has the average student's curriculum the merit even of a kaleidoscope, which, with all its chaotic variety, does at least form patterns? Rather, is it not to genuine education something as vaudeville is to the legitimate drama?

Not a great many years ago, the innovation of a free election of studies was made by many leading colleges in the name of vital and indispensable ideals. By many it was thought that for education a new day had dawned. The elective system would bring scientific subjects into the student's range of choice and give them equal rights with the time-honored humanities; it would recognize the individual aptitudes of young minds in time and allow them to special-

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ize in those things in which their particular abilities found free expression; and it would achieve the recognition of the important pedagogical principle of educating students in terms of their own free interests.

The results of this experiment have transformed education. The scientific subjects have indeed asserted their place along with the humanities,—sometimes even crowding them out; but the educational uses of the pure sciences in the colleges are more abstract than they ever were before. Students have been enabled to specialize; but as a matter of fact most of them omit to do so in any effective way. True, they now are educated in terms of their interests. But what sorts of interests? How are their interests motivated? Why do college students choose one course rather than another? It is likely to be for such a casual reason as that the course is popular; or because it has the reputation of being easy; or because the student likes the professor who offers it; or because his friends are in it; or because it comes in the morning instead of in the afternoon; or because he needs a three-hour course, and this is the only one that he can conveniently take?

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In other words, his motives are not the motives that belong to veritable life; they are interests hardly worth recognizing; they are just as far removed from the obligation to the social order as the ideals of his teacher. So, student and professor reënforce one another in making education irrelevant. Here, however, their co-operation ends. For, as has been shown, the student refuses to agree with any enthusiasm that his teacher's passion for scholarship is also his own main business.

The instruments of academic scholarship are reason and memory; but the glory of youth is imagination and dreams. Our modern pedagogy directs us to appeal to the interests of our students; but the interests in mind are rational interests, rather than those of imagination and feeling. Our educational process not only fails to appeal to the imagination of youth, but actually discourages it. Not long ago, I was asked to pass upon a doctor's thesis in one of the social sciences. It was a dreary affair,—accurate, but dreary. The sort of thing which a student would hope forever to forget in the glad exchange of it for a Ph.D. degree. But, in the midst of this Sahara of abstractions, I

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came upon an oasis,—an accidental revelation of imaginative grasp that promised life to the endless caravan of words. I noticed that my colleague had marked this passage, and I was glad. I went to him and said, "I am glad you noticed it, too." He replied, "Yes, he's got to strike that out!"

The first result of the foisting of the scholarship ideal upon young men and women is not only to discourage any real enthusiasm for college study, but to encourage the many and absorbing student's activities, which alone make "college life" vital and real. It is certain that most educators do not realize the underlying cause of the abnormal place of these activities. The simple reason is that, since the student can find little that is vitally and concretely human in his courses, he must find it elsewhere. His real college life is a realm he creates after his heart's desire; the realm of such concrete things as football and baseball; fraternities and sororities, with their social diversions; student politics; student literary ventures; student clubs and societies, many of them admirable as adjuncts to a sane and normal education. The student's leisure time is

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taken up with these, rather than with reading in or converse about the central subjects of his intellectual life. And the student's use of his leisure time is the sure index to his real concerns. Anyone who is such a "stick" as to be absorbed primarily in what the college regards as its main business is given the opprobrious epithet of "grind." It is significant that by "student activities" one never means the activity of studying! That task is a task indeed; thought of, most frequently, as an unwelcome invasion upon the time to be devoted to things worth while. First things first; and, in many colleges, many of the more capable students have little time left for the scholarly ideals of their professors. Even their disapproval they can, perhaps, afford to ignore; for the standard of student prominence is not scholarship at all; but heroism on the gridiron, social leadership, or the attractive traits of the good fellow,—traits, strange to say, that the world, too, will prize in the student's life beyond college walls. Such things the student talks about, lives to the full. His college education is a necessary incident, vaguely undesirable, but to be tolerated as indispensable to make college life possible.

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Let us glance at the fate of the subjects of college study when the student emerges into the world. If these subjects were hardly more than an incident of college life, they were at least a real incident; but they become the fast vanishing ghosts of dead things, after commencement. The "dear old college days" that the student sang about are remembered as the Eden of life; but his studies are, most of them, laid aside forever. The comrades he knew, their friendship is cherished; but the subjects he mulled o'er, where are they? They are one with last year's roses and lovers; the seeds were planted—or were they seeds?—but now "as the heart of a dead man, the seed-plots are dry." Even the texts were probably lost or loaned or sold at that glad time when the course was done and the grade safely recorded and the student said in his heart, "Thank God, I'm through with that!" He began Greek; but Xenophon's parasangs and Homer's gods and heroes have disappeared like troubled dreams; and the wealth of the thought of Greece shall be forever dead to him. Even his French shall lapse, and Molière and Racine and Hugo shall call in vain from unturned pages. Mathe-

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matics,—it opened no highways to him, unless some technical science called him to her exacting service. For a term or two, he knew something of physics and chemistry; but five years later he will do well to remember the color of his text-books. These subjects were not begun to be continued; they were begun to be abandoned.

Perhaps all this means that his college gave him the wrong courses; perhaps not. But their subject matter, at least, will have less to do with his later ambitions than the converse he had with his fellow-students. These subjects attained no continuity with life; in the struggle for existence, they were not deemed worthy to survive among life's permanent and growing values.

Perhaps there is only one thing worse than that the college student should forget his subjects; and that is that he should remember them. For to remember them is most often to go into life confidently solving its problems with abstractions that do not fit; as if one should talk in syllogisms in the market place, or try to breathe in two-dimensional space. Especially is this true if the emphasis has been upon the

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natural sciences taught narrowly and without perspective. Now, nothing is much more essential than that the modern student should know the fundamentals of the natural sciences. But it happens that the sciences are often taught as if they dealt primarily with concrete facts; at any rate, the student gets that impression. But science does not deal with concrete events as we live them, but only with abstracted aspects of them. Yet, somehow, the law of gravitation, merely an abstract descriptive formula, comes to be regarded as more real than a law of morals or the thought of God. And since the student gets the impression that the objects of scientific regard are tangibly real objects and the only objects, and that the natural science method is the only method of demonstration, he is led also to the conviction that the spiritual is the unreal, because natural science knows it not. One does not find souls in test-tubes; and in what laboratory shall God be disclosed as a concomitant variation? Inevitably, the student will tend to believe that "science disproves God"; or that "science disproves the soul"; or that "science disproves immortality,"—forgetting to ask *which* science; and unmindful

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that no natural science has anything to do with these things, either in content or in method. In other words, to the serious student, descriptive formulae and hypotheses will not only seem to be the real; but these formulae will tend to be used to dispose of issues with which they have no concern. This is what I would like to call "the pretension of concepts." Since the academic mind has it, it is natural that its teaching should be subtly infected with it. So the graduate goes into the world, tending to believe that, for the truly enlightened, the concepts and methods of natural science take the place of all the age-old verities by which men once lived and died.

Thinking scientists themselves see the peril of this. Says J. Arthur Thomson, "We speak glibly of 'Matter,' 'Energy,' 'Ether,' 'Atom,' and so on, but these are intellectual counters, rather than the realities themselves. They are, so to speak, counterfoils or symbols of reality. We may well say of them what Hobbes said of words: 'They are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools.'"

These, then, are some of the ways in which

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colleges educate, when education is thought of as an academic obligation. These things form the mind of the American college graduate, the typical finished product, with variations beyond number.

Just what is this education good for? For four years, the student has been fashioned by the academic uses of learning. Then, surely, his education for scholarship has made a potential scholar of him,—at least that! But no,—with exasperating irony, the clamors of the world have invaded the college just enough that the function of making the undergraduate a scholar, or even scholarly, is a farce. For example, the elective system, in its extreme form, was adopted partly because of the world's practical demands upon the college; but it has been inimical to scholarship, while the manner of teaching the courses elected has destroyed their utility for the needs which the world so insistently urged upon educators. Scholarship? "We turn out from our American departments of liberal arts many clean and manly men, noble and earnest women. But how many even of these know the rudiments of one subject thoroughly?" asks Professor Gayley. The

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American student "does not seem to understand what it is independently to master a subject, to grasp it in all its ramifications, and retain it in his memory as a whole."*

But surely a college education is good for something? No doubt. Just now, apart from its partial use as a preparation for vocational schools, it is good for that indefinable culture which is truly said to remain after one has forgotten what one has learned. And the very best that can be said of this culture is summed up by Dean West, of Princeton. "What has he [the graduate] acquired in the four years? At least some insight into the terms and commonplaces of liberal learning and some discipline in the central categories of knowledge, some moral training acquired in the punctual performance of perhaps unwelcome daily duty and some reverence for things intellectual and spiritual. He is not only a very different man from what he was when he entered, but very different from what he could have become had he not entered. He is wiser socially. He is becoming cosmopolitan. Awkwardness, personal eccentricity, conceit, diffidence, and all that

* Charles Mills Gayley, *Idols of Education*, pp. 39, 40, 45.

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is callow or forward or perverse have been taken from him, so far as the ceaseless attrition of his fellow students and professors has touched him. He is still frank and unconventional. But he is more tolerant, better balanced, more cultivated and more open-minded, and thus better able to direct himself and others.”*

This is admirable, so far as it goes,—although it seldom goes quite so far. At any rate, it testifies that college education is by no means a failure. But that is not enough. The academic motive in the training of American youth is not adequate. The social order requires men whom that motive cannot create, and yet whom the college must be chiefly relied upon to produce. Research is an academic concern. Education for research is an academic concern. Beyond these things, nothing in education is an academic concern.

* Andrew Fleming West, *The American College*, p. 29. One of a series of monographs in *Education in the United States*, edited by Nicholas Murray Butler.

VII

AMERICA AS AN EDUCATIONAL MOTIVE

For some time there have been leaders in education who have been well aware that the American college has not been fulfilling adequately its unwritten contract with society and the state. The result has been the proposal of educational aims intended to connect college education in some vital way with the social order. Education is to embrace not merely ideas, but ideals; not only subjects, but objects as well.

The proposed ideals are surprisingly various, and even conflicting. No one of them has gained both general and exclusive recognition; and some of those that have been most popular have not been effective, save as rhetorical shibbo-

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leths. There is a plenitude of educational purposes; but when was discussion concerning college education so bewildered with the lack of a common standard? When so tentative, so harassed with a multitude of conflicting theories? Everyone connects education with the social order in his own way; and this way is quite likely to be different from everybody else's way. Worst of all, it is likely to be vague. Education is learning to think; no, it is learning to do; not at all, it is for the training of citizens; but stop,—it is for vocational efficiency; on the contrary, it is for liberal culture; ah, but do not forget that it is for moral self-realization,—it is education for character that we want; no, it is for successful adaptation to the human environment of one's time; or, it is for social service. Its fundamental content is science; on the contrary, it is the humanities; no, the content is not the main thing at all, it is the discipline that counts; but discipline is a mistake, one can educate for concrete living only through the play of free interests; so, what we need is freedom of election; no, we need more rigidly prescribed curricula. Education is for the few, anyway; what! education is for all; it

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is the spiritual expression, the guarantee and triumph of democracy!

These conflicts of theory are encouraging signs. For it is through such conflicts that a new motive must be formulated. None of these ideals may be efficient; but their mere existence signifies a strenuous idealism. This new idealism is the biggest thing in education to-day. The important thing is that there is an unprecedented search for the unacademic and true purpose of the college. We may still be idealists without a common ideal, but the significant fact is that we do inexorably demand it, and are conscious that education cannot intelligently proceed without it. Moreover, it is a critical idealism. The ideals of yesterday's education were largely traditional and unquestioned; they just grew. To-day, they must meet the challenge of a new self-conscious reason, clarified by the vantage-points of an insistent social reconstruction.

No one of these newer ideals has yet gained general and exclusive recognition over the traditional and tacitly understood ideal of scholarship. Still, one ideal has succeeded far beyond all others, and threatens to submerge the

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rest,—the persistent and uncompromising ideal of vocational efficiency. This ideal has resolutely invaded the college, until its function has tended more and more to be narrowed to that of preparing the student for his later technical specialization in a professional school. This means that when college education is not regarded from the standpoint of the academic, it is likely to be regarded from the standpoint of the vocational. If the choice were merely between liberal scholarship and vocational training, then this latter ideal might be the finally right one; it at least does connect education with some of life's most insistent values and obligations. But is our obligation to the social order chiefly or solely found within our vocations as doctors, or lawyers, or engineers? There are many who will say so; or will say that any other ideal is so vague as to be of no educational value. Such would transform the college of arts into little more than a pre-vocational school, with curricula adapted to just this purpose.

But we were men before we were engineers or lawyers, and ought to be men afterwards. We are of particular guilds; but we belong to

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a bigger thing than that, the only thing that makes any guild worth while. There is still a vocation above all vocations,—or is this only one of those glamorous generalities that awake the academic mind's disdain? If so, the social order, in any real sense, is a shadow; obligations to it a myth; and truth the one thing that has no morals,—save the bloodless morals of technical success. The vocational ideal is an excellent ideal,—for the vocational school. It is not to be the supreme motive of the college, or of the university as a whole. The purpose of the college must be coincident with whatever is the supreme moral obligation of the age. It will be a wider and a deeper thing than scholarship on the one hand, or technical efficiency on the other; although it will demand both of these with all its soul.

To say that education must connect itself with the social order in general, and with the American social order in particular, through some bigger way than through training in the various vocations, is futile, unless we make our working conception of this social order exceedingly definite. The advantage of the vocational ideal, and one of the chief reasons for its vogue,

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is that it is at least specific,—it is not a vapid generality. It means a definite purpose, to be attained by definite methods. The same cannot be said of any other social purpose yet proposed.

Yet, what we call the American social order is surely a definitely concrete social order,—the social order that is here and now, uniquely organized, with its own intimate past and its own specific future, with exceedingly definite concrete problems and ideals. The maintenance of a very definite American order was the real motive of the American people in establishing education in the first place,—not the motive of scholarship; not the vocational motive. Our whole common school movement arose for one central purpose,—to serve a nation; to maintain the institutions of our democracy. Typical of the thought of the early advocates of American education are the words of Webster, "On the diffusion of education among the people rests the preservation and perpetuation of our free institutions." In terms of this ideal is our recognition of a governmental responsibility for education, expressed in the constitutional provisions of the

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states; in our taxation for education; in our compulsory laws; in our national appropriations and land grants; and in the establishment and maintenance of our national Bureau of Education. Nor may it be claimed that this motive of obligation to the social order applies only to the elementary school, not to the high school and the college. In general, higher education in America is the inevitable, although scarcely calculated result of the momentum of the common school movement. The belief in higher education is a corollary of the belief in education for a definite sort of civilization, coupled with the characteristically American demand for the best.

The initial motive of the American people in conceiving their well-known passion for education was right. *The aim of American education is to produce a definite American social order, in relation to a definite world-order.* But why, then, has not this initial purpose continued regnant? Why has it been abandoned gradually, almost insensibly, until it has become little more than a rhetorical flourish?

For the simple and sufficient reason that the conception of the American social order has

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~~been too nebulous~~, too vague, to be educationally efficient. It could hardly be otherwise. A well-defined national consciousness does not realize itself in a day.

But the time has come when a new national consciousness is both possible and necessary. It must be new in two senses: it must be critically defined; and it must be realized as a supreme obligation—a national consciousness, which is an ethical consciousness as well. For the aim of education is not merely to continue a social order, but to mold it; not merely to adapt the individual to it, but to train the individual to change both the social order and himself to the ideal of what the social order is not, but ought to be. The national consciousness is not to be static; it is to be dynamic. We need not only American ideas, but American *ideals*. And we have such ideals. It is characteristic of us Americans to think of ourselves in terms of the future. Our well-known optimistic temper bespeaks a firm faith in that future. We are a nation of idealists. And our ideal is made up of that complex of social and political institutions which can be characterized as “the American social order as we intend to make

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it," in spite of the fact that many of us Americans are so careless in our optimism as to let the future take care of itself.

It is to this ideal that the college owes its first obligation. This America of ours is not made yet. The supreme business of the college is to create its fashioners. Educational monasticism is to give way to educational statesmanship.

Now, this ideal may be said to be vague. But it is not too vague for legislation to take place in terms of it every year; for policies of statecraft to flourish or fall by its judgments; for wide-spread and significant discussions of every conceivable social problem to proceed under the compelling power of its purpose and hope, and to be decided in its name. Strange if the social scientist could not define this American social order, when he is so fairly adept in defining the genius of Dante's Italy or of Elizabeth's England,—which genius was a social tendency, unconsciously become a social purpose, pervading and molding a civilization. We have no hesitation in saying that there is such a thing as a characteristically Greek view of life, a Greek art, a Greek society, a Greek religion; and a

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Greek ideal pervading every one of these. If Greece had possessed a system of education that knew exactly what it was about, it would have discovered this ideal, and turned all education to its account. This is precisely what the two greatest Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, thought should be done. Well, just so, there is such a thing as an American view of life, and of American society, and of American literature, and the rest, in various degrees of accomplishment; and an American ideal pervading all these. And when college educators know exactly what they are about, they shall have discovered this ideal and turned our American education to its service.

But, one may answer, we have time's good perspective with which to evaluate those civilizations so "far away and long ago." It is perilous to attempt to estimate one's own age and one's own country. Is it? We do it anyway, and act every day upon the evaluation. The World War did not find us Americans entirely wanting in the consciousness of exceedingly definite and exacting ideals,—ideals not only political, but social, industrial, cultural, moral, and even religious. When fighting Ger-

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many, we were confident of a very definite American social order as it is and as it shall be. Indeed, we told our youth to die for it,—it was definite enough for that! Then why not definite enough for our youth to live for it, and so be educated for it? In preparing its soldiers for the war, our government went so far as to plan a War Aims Course for the thousands of members of the Student Army Training Corps, in attendance upon our colleges. It was specified that an important part of this course should be an exposition of the specific ideals pervading the various nations at war; including, with natural emphasis, our own country. The assumption was that we were fighting for worthy American ideals; that they could be ascertained; and that the soldier's heart and mind would be strengthened, even for the supreme sacrifice, by the knowledge. Was all this folly? If not, have these purposes of the American social order vanished with victory? Or, are they not needed now, more than ever before, to make sure the progress of those very institutions of civilization for which the war was fought and for which our soldiers died? Would it not be the supreme appeal if the American college could say to the

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young men who survive and enter its gates, "Your comrades died for a very definite and real thing called America; you and the youth of to-morrow are to be educated for this same definite and real and priceless thing!"

This is no narrow conception of education. For, as will be shown, the American order and the world-order have common obligations in the larger terms of culture.

VIII

THE TRUTH WORTH TEACHING

FORTUNATELY, we do not have to await a full interpretation of the American order before we can commence to reorganize college education as an obligation to such an ideal. If we merely admit the issue, that true education is in the service of an actual social purpose, education will be transformed mightily. Let us now see what is the fundamental nature and some of the general results of such a conception. I shall yet make my own attempt to define the American social order and hazard the further and still more specific results entailed by it. It is well, first, to see what would happen to the college under any interpretation of America. Then that much progress, at least, shall be secure, even if the writer's or somebody else's

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particular view of our national consciousness happen to be greatly at fault. The mere acceptance of the new criterion of education would modify many traditions not greatly cherished now, but retained from pure inertia; and it would modify them for the better.

First of all, college education would be relieved of the pervasive tradition of emphasizing facts over the values that alone give any significance to facts; of stressing the merely descriptive aspects of learning above its normative aspects; of putting the impersonal above the human; realism above idealism. When we view such one-sided emphases, made relatively permanent, the nature of the academic abstraction falsely called "truth" becomes clear at last. It is not only a separation of ideas from ideals, but a tyranny of ideas over ideals, of the barely factual over the worthy. This static and sundered view of truth is world-old. It has always been associated with mere "learning"; and with educational projects motivated by the merely learned. To put it otherwise, in the evolution of the race, our thinking, which arose for the service of progressive life, has overfunctioned in coming to exist for itself alone.

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Such thinking is an anomalous by-product of progress. It may be truth, after a sort; but it is truth that has lost its bearings. The relative supremacy must be reversed; the new conception of educational truth makes values interpret facts, ideals transform ideas, the norms of living transfigure life's host of descriptive items. For we live not in a world that is merely a panorama of facts, and where truth is just a matter of describing and cataloguing these facts. We live in a world where we seek to mold all facts to our purposes, and whose most significant problems, therefore, are problems of how to interpret facts and to compel facts into the service of great aims,—themselves thoroughly tested and approved. This means, more tersely put, that education should be a training of the rational will rather than of the passive reason, so long aloof from its human significances. Vital truth is not the solution of a problem so much as the correct statement of a problem to be solved not by thought alone, but by deeds. It is not so much a recital of events as they have been and are, as a plan of action that creates new events. It is not static, but dynamic.

The purposes that motivate and test this

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world of truth are utterly outside the sciences as such. The purpose of the sciences is truth for truth's sake; here, the purpose is truth for the sake of something else,—for the sake of the distinct service that truth can render; *which creates a new thing, serviceable truth, or truth transformed for service.* If the scientist is to have abstractions here, they are not to be abstractions snatched from the upper air,—nay, not even abstractions from life; they are to be transformed into abstractions working in and through life, and so no mere abstractions at all.

Perhaps an analogy from the applied physical sciences will help. An applied physical science is never just a pure physical science, with merely the addition that it is applied to something, as paint to a house. Physics, when applied, suddenly becomes a variety of new things, none of which is just physics, or even just applied physics. No, we suddenly have upon our hands engineering and practical optics and aviation and the multitude of special regions which the principles of physics serve; and which, through and for this service, become adapted and transformed. Just so, the success-

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ful application of a political theory to a concrete state means to transform that political theory into something new,—a system of principles of practical statecraft, also vitally and concretely related to a multitude of social tendencies that are not at all primarily political.

This is the unique realm of truth that serves the social order. It is the only truth that has any direct relation to that order. This is, as will be shown, the type of educational truth that ought to belong to the undergraduate college.

This transformation of truth is akin to Aristotle's transformation of Plato's Ideas. Plato tended to make Ideas real, apart from the things of this changing and imperfect world, which, at last, almost disappeared for him as an illusion. Thus, the Idea of horses became more real than actual horses. Aristotle gives these phantom Ideas reality again, by finding their reality to consist only in this same changing world of particular things, whose meanings are the soul of the concrete universe. It is akin to the Pragmatism of recent days, in so far, and only in so far, as an indispensable part of the educational meaning of truth is "that which works," "that which gives satisfaction"; not

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to be defined in merely rational terms as a "dome-like, temple-like system"; but finding something of its measure and test in the realm of human experience, complete and whole.

Now, the chief danger to guard against, in this conceiving of educational truth as "plans of action," is that it shall grow to signify that materialistic practicalness which nowadays goes by the seductive name of "efficiency." What we have been defining is, indeed, education for efficiency; but it is not the efficiency now commonly in mind as a rallying cry. No, if it is efficiency that we desire, it is a new efficiency; the old has been found wanting in many important respects.

For, observe our commonly vaunted efficiency! It has pervaded all realms,—business, government, social work, religion. It has invaded even the spelling of words. When we ask what all this efficiency is for, we find that its purpose is not so clearly defined as are its methods. We discover that it reduces itself largely to time-and-space-saving methods; yet, we hesitate to think that time and space are the most valuable things we possess! Doubtless all this efficiency arose for the accomplishment of

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indispensable human aims; but gradually, the passion for efficiency for its own sake has supplanted the human purposes for which it came into being; or, these purposes have become more and more materialistic, partly because most of the tools of the time-and-space efficiency are themselves material tools; as printing-presses and typewriters and automobiles. In education, this efficiency, at the best, has merged itself into the particular sort that is called vocational.

In the stress of this materialistic efficiency have been lost many of our moral ideals, individual, national, and international; the very ideals a true efficiency should serve. The issues of the war have helped us to regain some of them. At any rate, the academic mind has been indirectly and partly responsible for the reign of materialistic efficiency, of which the German aggression was only one symptom. For, the educator has too often left "practical" issues to the materialist; so that to be practical now means to most people to be materially successful. He had in his keeping many of the spiritual interests of mankind; he could have urged the higher practicalness, that large and sane idealism which the intellectual life sub-

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serves. But he has tended to betray his trust, by emphasizing spiritual abstractions, rather than those spiritual purposes that are the center and circumference of civilization. It is for the educator from now on to insist upon the higher efficiency,—the efficiency of sound social ideals and of expert means of attaining them, the efficiency of a new national consciousness and of a new national conscience.

Such an ideal will include the vocational ideal, but will not be submerged by it. At this critical time, it will contribute to social reconstruction a moral motive. This moral motive is imperatively needed now, after a war which has hastened the final break-down of the traditional standards of individuals, societies, and governments. Such a disintegration of customary norms is an essential stage in social rebuilding. But the danger is that we shall fail to furnish our new system of efficiencies with their supreme motive and purpose; or furnish it too late,—just as the greater Greek philosophers came too late with their constructive social program to save the glory that was Greece.

This conception of the business of the college accords well not only with the aim of the Amer-

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ican people in establishing education, but with the natural interests of the earnest student, at least at the time when he enters college. The college teacher is likely to find his Freshmen eager at first and almost enthusiastic in the prosecution of their subjects of study. But there is something about the college-atmosphere that gradually, insensibly, robs them of their initial ardor for the things of scholarship. They gradually transfer their center of interest from their studies to the student activities that have been reviewed. Nothing could speak more eloquently of the student's natural ~~and ineradicable~~ preference for the values of experience, rather than the mere facts of books. One cannot, must not, blame the student. In these student activities, he creates, all unknowingly, a needed corrective of merely academic ideals. It might rest here; but his corrective is not the ultimately best one that might be devised; there is a sure way to make the educational processes of the college the veritable center of student activities and culture, instead of a resented encroachment. It can be done at once by seriously considering education as belonging to that same realm within which the student has lived before

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he came to college; in which he insists upon living while in college; and in which he will certainly live afterwards, and find his cherished goals. The student well knows, although he cannot articulate it, that somehow his courses fall short of the living truth. He knows in his heart that, somehow, these abstracted bits of reality, physical, chemical, psychological, sociological and what not, are not truth. They are not fitted for wisdom's uses. They do not represent reality as it is; they represent a world carefully dissected, a shattered world, with no clue how to put it together again. If our college students understood the true significance of what has been done to them, they might well cry out the lament of the chorus of spirits in *Faust*:

“Woe! Woe!
Thou hast destroyed
The beautiful world
With violent blow;
’Tis shivered; ’tis shattered!

• • • • •

“Now we sweep
The wrecks into nothingness!
Fondly we weep
The beauty that’s gone!”

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For the dissection of life, however thorough, if left in its fragments, kills life and its truth, and its beauty as well. Beauty? When has college education ever aimed to see life in its beauty? Would the proposal ever survive the confident derision of the enlightened? But if the educator may not, at present, reconstruct the world in terms of beauty, may we not reasonably ask him to put the world together again for the plain truth's sake?

“Thou, 'mongst the sons of earth,
Lofty and mighty one,
Build it once more!”

Mere educational machinery fails. The groves of academe are cluttered with it. No, the solution of the educational problem is this new and definite moral consciousness, translated into a new and very definite national consciousness. Mere educational machinery inspires neither teacher nor student; this reaches both, and becomes the life of the machine. The educator is not a transmitter of information and method; he is a creator,—a creator just as truly as Shakespeare was a creator; only, Shakespeare's characters walked the stage in

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a world of seeming; while the educator's characters walk in a world that really is, and creates the world that shall be. Such creation, within a vision of American purposes, enlists not only the reason of youth, but the imagination and the constructive dream that is the fire of youth and the genius of age. The kind of success that a youth may achieve without them is a poor success. Without them, the college can give him no ideals worth suffering for, worth dying for. And an ideal not worth dying for is not worth living for,—or the men we acclaim as the earth's great were fools.

This, then, is the very general nature of educational truth, when college education is thought of as an obligation to a national consciousness, in the broad sense. In terms of it, the education of the future is to be the imparting of art in its wider significance, rather than of science in its narrower significance. The college is to be a "college of arts" indeed!

What further specific transformations would this ideal involve in our American colleges, irrespective, still, of what we shall define our national consciousness to be?

IX

SOME NEXT THINGS IN COLLEGE EDUCATION

THE first great result of the new ideal would be a definite revision of college curricula. Now, an adequate curriculum for any given student means the solution of what subjects he shall take, and their successful correlation,—such a correlation as gives his education a unity of perspective, as well as cumulative worth as he proceeds. To put the matter in terms of previous discussions, it means the doing away with intellectual monasticism and provincialism,—the isolation of subjects from a social purpose, and the isolation of subjects from each other. With the passing of the academic mind as a teaching mind, there disappear these two abstractions that belong to its teaching. Once sure that the prayer is for bread, we shall no longer answer it with this stone.

What subjects should the American college

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student be required to study? The only principle that can solve this question is a broad principle of utility.

Scholarship is not such a principle. It gives no reason for choosing one subject rather than another; it says, merely, Whatever subject you do choose, be scholarly,—cherish it for the truth's sake. The only principle of selection is haphazard, depending upon what subjects scholars happen to find interesting. It has come to pass, at this age of the world's learning, that scholarship (not the scholar) is catholic enough to be interested in everything. There is such a thing as scholarship in any subject. There is no principle of selection here,—none whatever; that is why we have made no selection worth while.

But while there is such a thing as scholarship in any subject, there is not such a thing as education for the social order in any subject,—not for this social order called America, if stringently enough defined. This social order furnishes the principle of utility that we have been seeking. It is not too narrow, as the utility of vocationalism; nor too broad and vague, as the familiar slogan of “education for char-

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acter," or "education for social service," or "education for democracy,"—vagaries in terms of which most well-intentioned reforms in education have been damned.

The college, thus keyed to the social order, would allow a certain freedom of election of studies. But the choice of subjects would be far more carefully supervised than now, because definitely motivated. There would be as many, probably more, absolutely required subjects; but these would not be required merely because they are "fundamental subjects," as now; but because they are fundamental to the achievement of a definitely concrete result, which is not now the case, since we do not "foist" extraneous educational aims upon the student, but let him assume the responsibility of deciding for himself—and for us—the aims of college education. The college of to-morrow will insist that its educational experts shall have some responsibility for this; that they shall supplant the relative caprice of the immature student with the wisdom of expert maturity, in matters that so profoundly affect the student's future and the social welfare. The Freshman is ill equipped to decide for himself the aims of edu-

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cation. It is not even a good training in initiative to allow him to do so. Such freedom is not educational democracy; it is educational anarchy. The teacher and the administrator are not ill equipped for such decisions; they have the maturity, the experience, the perspective; and it is only a false modesty that pursues a policy of educational *laissez faire* and is too squeamish to insist upon educational convictions which, however wide of the mark, are better than those of the tyro, who enters college not to teach the college the aim of his education, but to be taught this very thing. Already we know the miscellany of reasons he gives for his choice of courses and how inconsequential most of them are, even in his own eyes!

Next, the college, adjusted to its new obligation, would eliminate the smatterers and the smatter-makers. Certainly, with all subjects selected for and dedicated to a large concrete purpose, we shall, for the first time in latter-day education, insist upon the mastery of a subject, no matter what that subject may be,—not merely the mastery of principles, but the mastery of the special use of principles. No credit toward graduation should be given for any sub-

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ject not so mastered, even though the student be allowed to take it. For instance, a language for the language's sake should not be taught to undergraduates; it should be taught as the efficient introduction to the literature of the language at least; to the oral understanding of the language, if possible,—and no credit should be given for it until such a living mastery is effected. What a transformation this would win in both the method of the teacher and the attitude of the learner! And a like transformation would result in every other course worthy of a place in the undergraduate's curriculum.

Ah, but the study of some subjects—as language—for their own sakes is valuable discipline, even if it leads to nothing else. Surely, discipline is essential for any social order! The adequate reply is that the study of any subject short of a degree of applied mastery is a discipline which defeats the very idea of discipline. All subjects should be taught with discipline; none for the discipline only, for the simple reason that to do so is arrant educational waste and perversion; a bore to the teacher and an affliction to the student.

Further, the college, though motivated by the

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social order, would not teach subjects of such a nature, or in such a way, that they perish at commencement. The selection of subjects in terms of a definite purpose, mastered with unmistakable relevance to the American social structure, would mean that these subjects would be continuous with life after commencement, and thus become that most desirable kind of culture,—the culture which is an acquired passion for great things. Subjects abandoned at graduation are an unqualified condemnation either of the worth of these subjects for the education of the given student, or of the manner in which they are taught. They are significant not so much of the failure of the student as of the failure of his college. Of course, not every subject of college study will find its place among life's dear desires; there must be trial and error in college education, as in everything else human. But the error should be so minimized that what the student began in college shall, in the large, find its fullness of life beyond the college. The college curriculum should be to the life of the social order what the study of law becomes to the lawyer,—the defining of his aims and of the means to attain them. Or, to put it

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otherwise, the social order should be considered as the next stage in the education of the college man, to which all his previous education unmistakably leads. Ten years from his graduation, his college interests should have grown to robust maturity; not be lost among the illusions of youth—the sort not even sighed for! Either this, or the American social order is not worth life and death, as we stoutly insist when we are aware of being most highly ourselves.

Above all, the college sincerely serving the concrete order would, perforce, institute a new correlation of college studies. This is the second side of curriculum-planning; the second essential, too, for genuine mastery, and continuity, and the overcoming of intellectual provincialism. If it needs a well-defined purposive principle to select subjects, it requires the same principle to relate them and to organize them, after they are successfully selected. Indeed, this is the more difficult task, and the one which the American college has least courageously faced. How hard it is to hold apart ethics and sociology and economics and political science; chemistry and physics and biology! Yet, how easy it is to hold apart the ethicists and the

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sociologists and the economists and the political scientists; the chemists, the physicists and the biologists! These subjects are all aspects of Something; but the subjects themselves cannot determine what this Something is. The Freshman does not know enough to determine it; and the individual teacher ignores this Something, because he is a specialist; and because he is very suspicious that this Something, so undesirably vague to him, cannot be made efficiently clear. Yet, the very notion of specialization involves such a Something, of which any subject is just this or that specialization. And this Something is other than mere Learning or Truth; which, by the way, although passively accepted as real by the specialist, is the very vaguest Something in all the catalogue of educational purposes!

No, this Something is life; a very particular sort of life, the American life; related to a world-life; conceived as a definite structure and purpose. If such a purpose should turn out to be itself vague—which the logic of our faith forbids—it will never be so vague as that same Scholarship, or Truth, by which the college of to-day lives and suffers.

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Let specialists get together,

Now, just as specialists, they need never get together to determine what the concrete Something is for whose variously essential aspects they toil. But as educators of undergraduates, they become super-specialists, and must get together, in order to correlate their functions and results.

Perhaps the most anomalous fact in college education to-day is that they never do get together for this vital educational program. Faculty meetings do discuss educational policy; but educational policy of what sort? Did anyone ever hear of a series of faculty meetings, outside a vocational school, which attempted systematically, and as precisely as possible, the correlation of the functions of the various sciences, in view of a specific educational purpose other than scholarship? Hours are spent in the discussion of grades; of credits; of rule upon rule, revised and re-revised; and the machinery of education is, indeed, oiled and polished and frequently repaired. But there is not time, there is little disposition, to discuss the fundamental educational question, save casually. The psychologic atmosphere of the ordi-

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nary faculty meeting discourages this; and such extraordinary faculty meetings as may resolutely face it have yet to convene.

Association meetings of college professors are plentiful; but they are, almost wholly, meetings of specialists in some one subject, such as history or mathematics, who get together for their special academic interests. From such meetings we cannot expect solutions of the educational question; first, because specialists as such are not chiefly or at all interested in educational questions; and, second, because if they were, they simply could not, as specialists in one field, solve them adequately.

Precisely the sort of body essential to the solution of the question of correlation is the recently organized American Association of University Professors, which includes all the varieties of specialists enlisted in college teaching. Here is a body versatile enough and representative enough to achieve a new definition of educational aims and methods.

If specialists did get together, not as specialists merely, but as educators, with a concrete purpose for education in mind, they would be likely to discover that, while academic speciali-

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zation in a given subject means its separation from other subjects, the educational uses of it, the teaching of it to undergraduates, just as surely requires its correlation with other subjects. Without the slightest question, the vocational school finds this so. Mathematics is one thing; the educational use of mathematics in engineering is another thing, and relates mathematics to a score of other fields. Anatomy is one thing; but the educational use of anatomy for surgery is quite a different thing, and correlates anatomy to much learning that is not anatomy. So, economics, or chemistry, or history is a specific thing, academically regarded; but for any definite educational use, each is transformed, and straightway finds an organic relation, consciously present to the teacher, if it is to be made educationally worthy.

How may such correlation be effected, once the necessity for it is realized? Well, ultimately, it means the rewriting of most textbooks; but this is a far-off thing. Practically, it can be effected, first of all, by arranging all courses in carefully related groups, so that the student shall, in the main, choose not one single course, but alternative groups of courses.

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Someone will reply that we have group systems already. The answer is, first, that our group systems are, at best, but loosely administered; and, second, that they are devised on the basis of the resemblance of subject-matter, not related as functions in a specific aim for education. Without such an aim, carefully defined and lived up to, the correlation of courses is casual and unreal.

It has just been said that our group systems are, at best, but loosely administered. The college student needs expert advice in his choice of a group of subjects and of particular studies within the group he may have chosen. Nearly all colleges have advisers; but, commonly, they are chosen casually, take their tasks casually, and with no sure coöperation in large educational aims. Advisers, to be truly efficient, should be carefully selected; they should form a committee, meeting from time to time for common counsel and for the solution of the typical educational problems that concretely and continually arise. Their functions should be differentiated for underclassmen, on the one hand, and upperclassmen, on the other. Taking their responsibilities seriously, they alone

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could almost transform the entire educational *régime*. From them should emerge the most vital educational questions that could come before a college faculty for decision; and which would awake it, as nothing else could, to a virile educational consciousness.

Again, correlation of studies may be attained by special correlation-courses, to be given during the junior and senior years. Our fixed method now is to offer courses through single departments. But such correlation-courses as I now propose should be given through the co-operation of several departments. They should be regarded as the most important, the most significant courses in the undergraduate's college life. All else should be planned to lead up to these, as the climax and *rationale* of his education. This would make his education cumulative. It would do away with the requirements for graduation as the mere amassing of units of credit. Subjects would not be forgotten as soon as completed. In a later chapter, the definite subject-matter of one such correlation-course will be suggested.

In no event would the American college, accommodated to its new ideal, allow the comple-

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tion of a course to mean the finishing of its function in the student's college career. He would not be allowed to forget it. He would be given every conceivable stimulus to remember it, to revise it, to organize it, to weave it into the growing life of his college achievement. His tests of proficiency would not come merely after each course is done; but, before he is given his degree, he would be asked to give a final account of himself,—an account which would insure not only that he has retained the essentials of his subjects, but that he has learned their larger meanings and has attained some little initiative in thinking in their terms. And out of such organization in his education would come that instinct for organization which is essential to the genius of any modern social order, particularly his American own.

The ready objection to such a program for education is that it is pedagogically unwise. Instead of educating the student through his interests, it forces him to conform to a *régime* that ignores, or utterly quenches his own spontaneous desires.

To say this involves two serious misapprehensions. First, a misapprehension concerning

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what our prevailing system of college education actually does to the interests of the average youth; and, second, what a sound pedagogical doctrine of interest really means.

If there is conceivable any sure way of throttling the student's natural interests, our present scheme of college education furnishes that way, in spite of all pretensions to modern psychological method, and in spite of even the elective system. That the elective system, as traditionally administered, does not educate in terms of the student's vital interests, but chiefly in terms of his accidental interests, has been referred to. And if the foisting of purposes upon the student is psychologically a mistake, then the foisting of the scholarship purpose upon him is a much worse error than the foisting of any other purpose upon him would be; for it is the one purpose most foreign to the things he deems worth while.

What sane thing does education, in terms of interests, really mean?

It means that college education in the service of a purpose will not at all force that purpose upon the student, in spite of his interests. But if the purpose of education be the right one,

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it will accord with these interests; and will elicit them, and strengthen them, and make them more effective. It will not force interests but will select them. *This is true education: to define and strengthen desires worth while; and to teach the sure means of their fulfillment.* In the process, it discourages interests not worth while. Education is the teaching of right wants and of how to get them. Such education combines efficiently the seemingly contradictory values of initiative and discipline; the student shall be led to discipline himself through the wants which, by initial encouragement from without, he at length recognizes as his very own. The student is in a measure of bondage so that eventually he may be truly free. At present, the student's boasted freedom inerrantly leads to the paradoxical bondage of caprice.

The American college, once recognizing its obligation to the social order, would help the student to translate facts into values. If education is, indeed, the double function of teaching right wants and how to get them, it might, at first, seem a logical result to make a fundamental division of studies into those that reveal the ideals of education and life, on the one hand;

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and those that lend the skill to achieve them, on the other. But this would be a mistake. Every study, rightly taught, should be viewed from both its ideal and utilitarian sides. Further than this, the educator should freely recognize that, while every study possesses these two functions, some subjects preponderately serve one rather than the other. For instance, literature, ethics, history and government are preponderately studies that reveal ends; while physics, chemistry, biology and the natural sciences in general—and the vocational sciences, in particular—are primarily studies of skill by which ends may be achieved. The educator should manage these subjects for the curriculum with a full consciousness of these values. Above all, he should correct any tendency to make paramount skill or efficiency for its own sake. Skill, efficiency, should be ever succinctly subservient to the training in the purposes they serve, and to which the college is dedicated; else skill is empty, and efficiency abortive.

Finally, the college of to-morrow will let a broad ethical culture assume a new place in liberal education. This essay has maintained that the national consciousness that is to motive edu-

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cation should be thought of as a supreme obligation; which is another way of saying that the national ideal is a moral ideal, as well. If it is fit to be the American ideal at all, it can be nothing else than the goal and the standard of the right, written large. It is not that the state creates right and wrong; that is too near the recent German idea to suit us. It means, rather, that in a democracy the conception of what is right creates the state, together with its world-view; else it is utterly defenseless.

Now, it happens that both the individual and the nation need a faith in moral verities, as never before. The individual needs it, because the break-down of dogmatic standards has not yet been superseded by standards rationally defensible. The result is a wide-spread moral scepticism,—a belief that, to those truly enlightened, morals are only matters of custom, after all; or that, at best, they are to be resolved to maxims of prudence. The nation, too, needs a rational moral faith at this time; for it is living in an era of momentous decisions, which need adequate criteria to assure their wisdom and their righteousness.

If this be so, the problem of moral education

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is imperative, much as we may dislike it and all the tribe of vagaries it has involved in the past. Certainly, it is the most vexatious problem educators have, when they recognize it as a problem at all. For some time, at least in our larger universities, we have let the problem drop, hoping that it would take care of itself; or, claiming that it is not the genuine business of the college anyway. But this moral aloofness of the college has tended to breed moral indifference in the student; and moral indifference begets, in turn, moral scepticism; and moral scepticism is dangerous to any man, especially to an educated man; and particularly dangerous to a democracy. Not only has the college bred moral indifference; its emphasis of facts over values, and of natural science as the only method of substantiating "facts," has tended to positive moral disbelief; which is precisely the most unfortunate result, for both society and the individual, that education could achieve.

Many educators have been conscious of this result, and have deplored it. Methods of moral education have been suggested, especially for the elementary and the high schools, where the

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deficiency is most felt; but most of these methods have proved only moderately successful. Courses in ethical theory are too abstracted from life, and may lead the student to become expert in moral sophistry. Courses in practical morals tend to become courses in moralizing—a sort of thing which healthy youths dislike above all. Other solutions have the fatal defect of rendering morals a sort of appendage to life, rather than life itself; or of making it a particular study coördinate with other studies, such as physical geography and history.

The first requirement for the adequate solution of the problem of moral education is to relieve morals of its false isolation from everything else, as though it were something by itself. It is life; not an annex to life. It is not to be put into any one course. It must be a result attained by the whole process of education. The problem is not to introduce a thing called morals into education; the problem is to make education moral. Yet this, too, is misleading; for the word “moral” has been narrowed too much, and awakes prejudices that are quite justified, considering the narrow and negative and repressive and unhuman and unwelcome

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thing this much-abused word has grown to mean. The truly moral is that which we truly value. It stands for life's supreme values,—the things we deem most worth while, when we are best aware of life's larger meanings. Applied to a given society, the moral is, in the last resort, the fulness of the ideal toward which that society struggles, and in terms of which it judges its progress. For all progress is moral progress, if it is progress at all; and all ultimate ideals are moral; or they have no authority over us men who, in the last measure, find ourselves justifying our sterner deeds by their righteousness,—their tendency to attain an end accounted supremely good.

Moral education is relieved from its false isolation if we make this ideal of social progress the criterion of obligation; in terms of which social institutions are organized and maintained, including the institution of education. College education in America becomes moral when it is consciously in the service of a moral obligation, conceived as a nation's obligation toward itself and toward the world. This is not a vague thing, or an impractical thing, or an unprecedented thing. Attention has already

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been called to the fact that during the World War, America possessed a definite national consciousness; it was an emphatically moral consciousness as well. Our diplomatic pronouncements before we entered the war were in terms of this; and it was in view of its significance that we joined our allies, and gave of our substance and our sons. Our patriotism was keyed to this. Our splendid morale was largely a faith in the moral rightness of this American ideal. In the war, "morale" meant a number of conflicting things; but the morale that defeated Germany was the morale that a great French philosopher, Bergson, and a great French general, Foch, identified with moral faith. The American ideal may seem vague to many; but, strange to say, it was definite enough, with its international implications and obligations, accurately to motive America's part in the subtle and exacting decisions at the world's peace table. If accurate and authoritative enough for this, the same social and political purpose might seem accurate and authoritative enough for American education to consider it.

Should the American ideal gain this author-

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ity, not one course, but the entire college curriculum would be a moral training, in the large sense and in the only desirable sense. And, as already shown, the curriculum, thought of in this definite way, involves educational results, every one of them of tremendous moral value, —discipline of purposes, rather than their caprice; initiative, from which purposes are selected; organization; continuity, or persistence; thinking in terms of values first, and of facts afterwards; thinking in terms of an absolute value, above all values, destroying mere moral relativity and indifference and scepticism and unbelief. Our students strikingly lack these very qualities. The American social structure imperatively needs them in its educated men.

Such are a few of the next things in American college education, viewed as an obligation to the American order. There are a great many more. But before we can determine them with any assurance, we must first ask a question that can no longer be postponed,

What is America?

X

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IF the American social order is to become the efficient motive of education, it is imperative that it be conceived as just as definite as it actually is. America must be defined to herself with some such concreteness as a vocation, as engineering or law is defined to itself; definitely enough, that is, to become a specific goal; definitely enough to organize knowledge, all the resources of scholarship, into practical wisdom. Upon this the future of the college depends.

The efficient disclosure of what America really means is the next supreme task of educators. It is a formidable task, a well nigh impossible task,—surely a task that will never be more than approximately done, since there are no static goals of social progress. And mere approximations, however exact, do not please either

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the academic or the technical mind, with their common love of closed and finished concepts. But essential tasks for the future of education are not to be abandoned because formidable, or complex, or even endless. Education is a problem as large, as complex, and as endless as life; and it cannot be treated as small and simple and circumscribed. And the task of interpreting America to herself for educational purposes must be done by the educator himself, who commands the technique indispensable for it.

Now, since in education as in everything else, it is easier to propose problems than to solve them; easier to suggest an ideal than to define it, there comes at this point the inevitable challenge to the writer, Why don't you define it yourself? You have complained that other educational ideals are vague; well, show us that this ideal of yours is any clearer. You have said that the American social order was the initial motive of American education and the inspiration of the common school movement; yet you confessed that this motive was gradually abandoned, because too nebulous for efficiency. Show us that this nebulosity was not an inherent defect of such an ideal. You have ar-

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gued that a definition of the American social order is possible; well, if it is so easy, make the definition a fact. So far, your postponement of such a definition looks suspiciously like an evasion.

Now, my general thesis would stand, even if I could not, or would not, attempt further to define the American social order. The omission of such a task here, or by me anywhere, is not a proof that it cannot be done and should not be done, in the interests of the future of American education. To argue thus would be to commit a most arrant *ignoratio elenchi*. But there is not the slightest doubt that it is better to accept the challenge, and to support my conviction that the motive for education can be defined, by making the attempt myself, however inadequate it may turn out to be. Such an attempt, at the least, will have the merit of revealing more clearly what I mean by the American social order as a motive for education; and it may suggest what essentials a definition of it must fulfill, in order to be genuinely effective.

For any person to attempt to interpret the American social order in detail would demand many pages, if not many books. However, for

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the purpose of this essay, an outline of such an interpretation is proffered. It may be thought of, if the reader pleases, as a sort of epitome of some imaginary book, which may be written some day by somebody. Naturally, such an epitome will state results, rather than the arguments by which they are reached; and, for our purpose, only those aspects of the American ideal will be stressed as ought to have some bearing upon the college; and yet which, thus far, have not been sufficiently effective in shaping its educational policy.

But, while brevity involves a certain dogmatism in our exposition, it is advisable to state the method by which we may conceive our results to have been attained. For the danger is that we shall start with some preconceived theory of what America is or ought to be, and then that we shall proceed to twist our facts to fit our theory. Such a procedure is easy; but it has been done so often that it is no longer worth while. How shall we guard against such an empty dogmatism?

First of all, why not let America speak for herself? For over a century, the American people have been interpreting themselves

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through their deeds, through their institutions, and by means of state documents and the public utterances of their acknowledged leaders. There has been time enough and there have been occasions enough for the American people to have expressed, quite specifically, what they are and what they intend to be. They have created a constitution, and have gradually refashioned it; they have waged several wars, whose issues involved wide-spread and often heated discussions concerning the American ideal; they have voiced their opinions upon the issues of thirty-odd presidential elections, when their political parties have fought among themselves for the monopoly of all their country's virtues; they have engaged in countless state, county and municipal campaigns, which defined and redefined and immediately demanded an American millenium; every day they read vigilant newspapers, responsive to every slightest variation in the public pulse, discussing freely and from all points of view America's responsibilities, her failures, and her hopes. It would be stupid of us if, with all these means of expression at command, we could not discover a few of the fundamental attributes which have accrued irre-

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vocably to the American conception of the social order,—enough attributes to create a very definite educational obligation towards its living purposes.

A study, by such a method, of what America means soon reveals a current fallacy that the American ideal is to be thought of as solely, or chiefly, political. It is natural that the average American should tend to identify America with a form of government. He has been brought up to do so; and his patriotic traditions have taken that meaning. Yet, of course, America is infinitely more than a form of government; indeed, its form of government is only one corollary of the more fundamental ideals for which America exists. Quite possibly, it is this ready identification of the American ideal with the political ideal that has led many educators to feel that education, in its terms, is too narrowing a function for a college of liberal arts. The slogan of "education for citizenship" tends to have this merely political connotation; and, while indispensable in its place, is not broad enough to embrace more than a few of the legitimate aims of the college. It is in this sense that the educator may truly feel that, while

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the soldier may well die for political ideals, yet education must be for that something larger which political institutions only help to make possible.

Let us, once and for all, abandon this narrower interpretation of America, both nationally and internationally. America is not only, or even chiefly, a political order; it is a social order. And a careful scrutiny of this social order reveals that *America stands not only for a distinct ideal of the state, but for a distinct interpretation of what human persons are and what they may become*; which in turn means a distinct interpretation of social grouping; a distinct criterion for the justification and growth of the institutions of economics; a distinct motive for literature and the arts; a distinct setting and service and hope for religion; and, most certainly, a distinct ideal of international and inter-racial rights and obligations. Such things are not mere vagaries. They are the most living things we Americans possess. And it would be preposterous to suppose that, with distinct ideals of all these phases of life, America would involve no distinct ideals of education. Indeed, what must be shown next is that

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every one of these ideals that have been named, as well as their total meaning taken together, has a direct bearing upon our colleges,—if they are to recognize their obligation to the American social order as real.

What is America? There have arisen scores of definitions of it. Students of the social and political sciences have been proposing them from time to time. But these definitions vary surprisingly. Perhaps it is safe to say that nearly every one of them contains an element of truth. But if this is so, there must be some one conception adequate enough to contain and conciliate them all. What is this conception?

The basal fact of any civilization is the view it holds of the nature and value of human persons. The meaning of a social order is validly determined only from this. Out of some view of what a human being really is evolve all a civilization's institutions, social and political; and in this lies the secret of their ultimate triumph or defeat. For history has its logic, and the major premise of this logic is forever what this nation or that has to say about what men are and may become. And this logic is inexorable. Given a civilization that founds its

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fortunes upon an insufficient view of what men really are, and none of its triumphs can deceive its certain doom. Now, the struggles of the American order imply the latest word and the most adequate word with regard to what human beings mean. It is the logical and inevitable product of that progress in the fortunes of the person which is history's real significance.

The American social order implies, first of all, that persons are social. It stands for the realization of the individual through society, and of society through the individual, and it calls upon history to prove that the welfare of neither can be sundered from the welfare of the other. And, since men are inalienably social, their social rights are not regarded as artificial, but are as inalienable as are their social obligations,—and no more so. And, in this, America is psychologically, yes, morally sound.

Educationally, this social interpretation of the person should mean significant things for the college. The American college should train the student's interests so that they will ultimately and freely coincide with the needs and ideals of the social institutions into which his

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life is to be cast. In the earlier stages of education, there should be an abundant, although judicious, discipline of individual caprice; a discipline which, in the elementary and high schools, may seem a limitation of freedom; but which, in the college, should surely unfold itself as truest self-realization; the discovery and the living thrill of that larger social self which it is the college's business to make real in the mind of youth. Nor may the college sacrifice this social freedom to such irrational freedom as often goes by the mistaken name of student democracy, and which sometimes degenerates into a sort of educational Bolshevism. Student democracy the American college must certainly have; but student democracy can never be that complete democracy for which it is the college's function to train its men. It must ever be a reasonably limited democracy, for the sake of insuring its ultimate social sanity.

Second, the American consciousness seems to imply the bold conviction that persons are priceless,—not things to be used and valued in finite degrees, but the veritable ends for which all uses exist; and so the criteria of every value under the sun.

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In college education, this conception of the infinite worth of the person, if once realized, would be revolutionizing, and would tend to that very transformation of the academic which I have insisted upon. The aim of education would be no longer the amassing of information, but the stimulating of a type of men. When a man graduated, the college would no longer ask, chiefly, What has he learned? but, What has he become?

Third, American democracy not only implies, but openly proclaims that persons, being priceless, are absolutely equal, as persons. This equality has been America's perpetual challenge to the world.

Does this involve anything for the American college? It certainly does involve something toward which American education has been tending steadily,—an equality of educational opportunity, which must now be extended to the college as well as to the elementary and secondary schools. This does not mean the absurdity that everyone should have a college education (we need a new heaven and a new earth for that, as well as a new college); but it does mean that everyone should have a chance to

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obtain it,—the only limit to the chance being one's own abilities. It is no denial of such educational equality for the college to insist upon high standards for those who enter its gates; indeed, such an insistence encourages the very abilities which the college should stimulate for democracy's safety and progress.

Fourth, when American democracy proclaims persons to be equal, it is, quite evidently, considering persons not in terms of what they are at any given moment, but in terms of what they may become. At any finite moment, they are limited in attainments and vary greatly in these; but as possibilities they are to be considered as equal. No one has a right to set a limit to what a person may become. Persons are measureless in capacities. The evidence of the ready acceptance of this doctrine by Americans is easily found. Americans are not ready to put final limitations upon the possibilities of any man. The newsboy may become President; and the President, in turn, has his future. The national optimism is another reflection of this same dynamic point of view. The vista of America's future growth is endless. No goal of progress shall be final. Even the Constitu-

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tion is to be taken in the spirit, not in the letter; it is no longer a final achievement, but a prophecy. Democracy is engaged in a "creative evolution," for which no triumph is the last.

It follows that, for the American college, the ideal of what is an educated man can be no set product, static and precisely definable. America knows no educated men, but only men in the infinite process of being educated. For an American to "finish" his education is a presumptuous absurdity. This dynamic view of men involves just that revolution of the academic already hinted; namely, that the college teacher is successful only as he encourages the young American to make his measureless possibilities function by acquiring right wants, equally measureless, so that they become his imperative demands upon the world and himself. He shall be educated in English, say, not merely by having read the classics, but by having attained a living desire for the literature of the masters and for a mastery of expression in his own tongue. So with any other subject; a dynamic view of life implies a dynamic view of education for it.

Fifth, the American insists that he is free.

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He does not mean that that he is free to do as he pleases, regardless of his fellows. This would be the freedom of anarchy. A true man of democracy repudiates a freedom of selfishness, which would disintegrate the very democracy that he professes as his ideal. Freedom must be a social freedom. So, *the freedom of the American democracy can mean nothing more or less than the freedom to seek the social goal, in accordance with the reason of each, but voluntarily and freely subject to the revision of all.* True, freedom is the power to get one's wants fulfilled, to realize oneself; but we have already seen that the self of American democracy is a social self; and its most selfish want is, inalienably, the social good.

For the American college, freedom means, beyond its social obligations already stressed, that men develop only through self-development; that all thoughts that a man can think, or deeds that he can do, that are worth anything to himself, are thoughts that he thinks for himself and deeds that are born of his own convictions. In recent college education, this doctrine of self-activity has been increasingly recognized. Democracy in education means that the

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individual is educated from within, not from without; that, in the last issue, he is led to educate himself. More and more we realize that what the student accepts upon mere authority is worthless, even though it be the bold and noble outlines of an Aristotle's scheme of things entire. More and more we realize that what the student learns through his own thinking is of infinite value, even though it be the commonplace detail of a butterfly's wing. In general, teachers are learning to lead the more mature student to the sources, even if the leading be, at first, through books about the sources. The laboratory method, where the student learns through his own labor, is spreading from the physical sciences to the social and political sciences. The one thing of all others to be taught the student is the adoption of the evaluating attitude toward all his lectures, his books and his facts. Democracy, with its insistence upon free self-activity, is making of the college a great laboratory, whose best instruments each student brings with him in his powers of original thinking, and whose product he finds in that self of his that goes out to the tasks of the world,

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Finally, freedom involves a further attribute of democracy's person, too little stressed by the theorists of democracy. The freedom or right to govern oneself implies the ability so to do. Now, the ability to govern oneself is the capacity to arrive at reasoned convictions. In other words, the doctrine of democracy implies the far-reaching assumption that in each of its individuals is the source of truth; that its members are fundamentally rational; that they do not need to rely upon mere authority for their conclusions. They are not only free, but rationally free. Popular sovereignty is defensible upon no other basis. True, at any period of democracy's growth, individuals will vary greatly in their capacities to attain reasoned conclusions on matters of social welfare; but, only by having the right and responsibility of registering such convictions equally with others, can their power to find truth ever be stimulated.

The American college should retain and re-emphasize, as one of its central purposes, the training of the power to reason. Courses in logic will not suffice, although a good course in logic may well be indispensable. Nor, as I have already pointed out, will it suffice merely to

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continue the emphasis which the college has made upon mere rational analyzing and abstracting. What is needed is the ability to reason not merely with abstract concepts, but to reason in, through and around living problems, especially the concrete problems of social, political and moral import; the ability not to think logic, but to think logically; which means to think with precision, with sustained application, and that continuity which rests not until an issue is solved, if it is solvable, even though it never be completely solved; to think with a wide grasp, and a power of organization of manifolds into unities. To be able to think thus, to some appreciable degree, should be one of the essential marks of the college man in such a social order as ours.

Such are some of the meanings of the human person, implied in the more common pretensions of the American social order. Let us be thoroughly aware that the educational corollaries named by the way are quite as general as are the social principles passed in review. More specific implications for the college will naturally come later, when we analyze the several concrete institutions of American life.

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And now note that it is only by viewing men and women in these fundamental ways stressed by America that the free and rational pursuit of ideals, educational or otherwise, is possible at all. For the sake of making ideals possible was the American order born! Men created it to give themselves a chance, for the first time in history, to grow toward their full stature—to live in the largest sense of living. For a moral ideal is finally worth while to me only when it is an infinite possibility; when opportunities to attain it are as available to me as to any other man,—that is, as free as they can be; when I am vindicated as rational, as having the source of truth, and so of right action and personal initiative, within myself; when I am free; when I am of ultimate worth, ultimately real, real in my own right. All this the American order comes to guarantee. It is not merely a moral ideal; the belief in it is the only condition of having any moral ideals at all!

The foundations of American life are laid. What shall be the superstructure? And what has the American college to do with it?

XI

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Out of the American vision of what men are and what they may become, evolve all the fundamental expressions of American life; instinctively, for the most part; and so, subject to the deviousness of an experience forever correcting itself; but which, correcting itself in quite definite ways, reveals that the vision which is the soul of its meaning is ever present.

What are some of these expressions of American life? And how shall the American college adjust itself to them?

First, there is the American state. The state is one of many expressions of the American order and exists to guarantee its sure success. All the significant things that belong to political America as an ideal are already implied

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in America's interpretation of the nature of men and their rights. Thus, the freedom and equality that we have found belonging to the American theory of the person translate themselves, politically, into self-government, with its freedom and equality of thought, speech, and ballot; and of civil and political rights. This self-government becomes a government through elected representatives for only one reason,—it is impracticable for each one of the great democracy to govern directly.

In such a government, the functions of the representative are two: To express the people's will; and to lead it in the light of his unusual opportunities for information and wisdom in matters of public concern. On the other hand, the functions of the citizen are to acquaint himself with the issues that constantly arise for his decision; to express and to discuss his convictions freely with his fellows; and freely and fearlessly to register his convictions through the franchise,—in other words, to realize his rational freedom through a thoroughly conscious political responsibility.

If we scan American politics as it actually is, we find that the citizen has failed and that

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his representative has failed quite notoriously; and in ways in which the American college ought to be conspicuously equipped to remedy. The failure of both the citizen and his representative is, first of all, in the lack of expert intelligence in matters political; both tending to substitute for political wisdom an optimistic fatalism which is convinced that no possible error could ever render American democracy anything but triumphant. Add to this our characteristically American belief, noted the world over, that anybody can do anything, particularly the deeds involved in all phases of governing.

Such faith is fatal. The college can correct it. Precisely here is where the limited but important ideal of "education for citizenship" finds an indispensable place. A course in the American State, including intelligent discussion of vital political problems—yes, and comparative government—should be required of every American college man. And in all this, the institution of American government should not be left unrelated to the larger aspects of the American social order, whose security and progress is its only justification.

The American college can help America to

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redeem a second noteworthy failure of both its citizens and politicians; namely, the failure to realize government as a social responsibility, before which every whit of selfishness must give way. The indifference of the citizen to the franchise; his submission to the intrenched power of the Bosses; his regarding his government as a far-away thing, somehow abstracted from his private and local concerns,—these all are facts; and they are symptoms of an apathy which plays directly into the hands of the politician, who, selfish in his own way, makes of the citizen's indifference his own opportunity; abuses his function as a representative and ignores his responsibilities as a leader; or deliberately takes advantage of his inside knowledge to mislead. The college can remedy this, too, and in only one way. It can remedy it by making its entire curriculum and its administration a training for the feeling and the conviction of responsibility to the social order, including its political institution,—a moral responsibility, conceived as the supreme business of the educated man; not as a mere incident among the things worth while. With the American social order as the aim of education, the American state at once becomes

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an integral part of that living purpose, in terms of which college education shall exist. One of the most encouraging signs for the future of the American state is the increasing emergence of college men into expert leadership in political life. Education in America may yet be, in fact as well as in theory, what our forefathers wanted it to be, the bulwark of democratic government.

Second, the American order is an economic and industrial order. If, in the American conception, all things must serve the person as the ultimate end and criterion of values, so must all economic institutions. Verily, there is such a thing as economic and industrial democracy,—as an ideal. What such economic democracy in detail would be is one of the grave questions for the educated man to solve, and to solve speedily. The question is, certainly, imminent and imperative enough. It is going to be answered in one way or another; quite possibly, in the wrong way. The risk is that the more pressing economic and industrial questions may be decided in one of two equally disastrous ways: Either by the one-sided prejudices of the wage-earner, through a growing self-con-

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scious solidarity, which means dictatorship, with or without violence; or, by the equally one-sided prejudices of the wage-payer, through the adroit manipulation of the established order, for which he has some genius. Or, a third way is possible, —continuous compromises, out of which shall emerge again and yet again the everlasting conflict, to be compromised once more.

The solution of the economic problems of the American order cannot rightly come through the triumph of the interests of one class, or through the compromise of classes. Such solutions are contradictions to the very being of the American order. Virtually, they make large bodies of men things to be used, not ends in themselves. Such solutions mean the exploitation of the employer by the employee; or the reverse; or both. No, the economic problem must be solved, painfully and slowly as you please, not by prejudice or by special interests on the one side or the other; but by an impartial and expert reason, whose supreme qualification is the possession of a standard of values higher than the merely economic; and expressive of the many-sided good of the social order as a whole. Never and nowhere was rational and

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judicious leadership through courageous convictions needed more than now and here. It is the business of the college to furnish much of the material for such leadership, if the college be granted to exist for the social order at all. And the American college must afford not only leaders, but a large body of men who can intelligently support intelligent leadership, once it appears. Certainly, every American college man should have a training in economic and industrial fundamentals. But it must not be an economics academically taught. It must mean a learning to think in economic terms, based upon a conviction of the gravity of the economic situation, and stimulated by a sympathetic knowledge of comparative points of view and of contemporary movements of economic import. America and the world seethe with such movements now; the college graduate must meet them not indifferently or ignorantly, but responsibly and intelligently,—which means a fundamental recognition of the relation of economic values to the other human values for which his college exists. Once there was a danger that some colleges might find themselves indirectly subsidized, to the exclusion of open-

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mindfulness in economic teaching. But this danger has been minimized as the academic freedom and tenure of the college professor have become more and more secure. Nor may it be forgotten that, added to the direct influence of the college, is the indirect influence of the technical schools of our universities, which yearly send into the world of economic and industrial life trained experts, many of whom have taken part of the college course; including, it is to be hoped, some such training in economic thinking as I have urged. The indirect influence of such men, trained broadly, even if superficially, in economic questions would be invaluable.

Third, the American order means a new conception of social groupings. Most obviously, the social theory of our democracy makes a system of castes or of semi-castes impossible. That is, there can be no group whose existence means the possession of valuable and exclusive privileges for personal advantage over their fellows, and which is not founded upon principles of inclusion for which any person as a person may qualify, in time. Thus, there can be no aristocracy in the European sense, based

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upon such a forbidding barrier as that of birth. And this has sometimes been urged against American democratic society as a defect. Indeed, the innate monotony, the social dead level, the spiritless and uninteresting uniformity of democratic society (as a theory) often has been enlarged upon. We are told that the doctrine of social equality inevitably carries with it social sameness.

But the criticism of democracy's society as monotonously uniform assumes that the equality of democracy prohibits the institution of social groups of different grades, mutually exclusive in any sense. Yet not all social groups are castes. And there may be, indeed, a highest social group, without its constituting itself an aristocracy.

For, remember that the doctrine of equality means that persons are equals as ends—as possibilities—and that they have freedom,—the freedom to seek their self-realization in the social goal, through the reason of each. This social goal, this ideal democracy, is theoretically and really the same for all. But while all have the same ideal; and while, thus, and only thus, is the solidarity of democracy secured, not

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every person is in the same stage of progress toward it. Nor have those in the same stage the same individual problems to meet,—the same interests. Men are, indeed, the same in so far as their ideal is the same, and in so far as they have equal opportunities for attaining it. But men are different in so far as they represent different cultural stages toward the ideal, and express their individuality by realizing it in their own ways.

Now, men will naturally and reasonably group themselves according to their fundamental "interests," as we say. And the fundamental interest of democracy's man, apart from the universally shared interest in the common democratic ideal, is his interest in those things which appertain to his own stage of self-realization toward the social goal. *The true principle of fundamental groups in a democracy, then, is community in a stage of culture, or of progress toward the common social ideal.* This has reference to democracy's fundamental groups. They are formed on an ethical principle; for democracy is an essentially ethical conception. Other social groups may be formed upon more superficial bases; but they are not

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integral parts of the organization of democracy's society, as such. And they must disappear if, in principle, they are opposed to it.

These social groups of ideal democracy are exclusive in the sense that no one is acceptable to a group unless he fulfills in himself the qualifications that belong to the sort of culture which it represents. These social groups are open to all in the sense that any person has within himself the capacity for attaining any given stage of culture, and so any social group whatever. Thus, no group of democracy can become a fixed aristocracy. One may add that no sane man would want to belong to an association of persons whose cultural attainments and interests were widely different from his own.

Further, the spirit of democracy permits no snobbishness on the part of any of its social groups. A social set might well be formed in strict accord with democracy's principles, and yet not truly represent democracy, if its members looked upon persons of less cultural attainment with the Pharisee's thanksgiving. For, in democracy, the social ideal of the member of a restricted group is the good not only of his kind, but of the whole of society. Should he

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restrict his aim to those of his own sort, he thereby would turn his back upon democracy and join his fortunes with an abortive aristocracy. If the masses are not as high as he in cultural progress, he will not look down upon them with contempt, or pity, or indifference; his aim, even in his restricted associations, is to put the masses in the way of progress, not as charity, but as social justice. Thus, the members of a truly democratic social set are not exclusive, in the sense that they limit all their social recognitions to their kind alone. They esteem themselves part of the larger society, whose obligations are forever prior; and for whose obligations, indeed, they are formed into a group the better to discharge.

What can the college do to mold American social sets into an approximation to America's meaning of a social order?

Well, first of all, it can attempt to correct the obvious shortcomings of American social sets as they exist. Best of all, they can do this by correcting these same shortcomings within the society of the college itself. What are these defects that must be minimized within the student's world, for the sake of that later world

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he is to enter? To put it boldly, how do American social sets, as they are, sin against democracy?

They sin against democracy in so far as they do not try to discover their real relation to the social order as a whole, and are not fully loyal to what they do know.

They sin against democracy in so far as they emphasize exclusiveness for its own sake; an emphasis that is aided and abetted by the inherent and imitative snobbishness of the masses.

They sin against democracy in so far as they emphasize principles of inclusion which are impossible for a person as a person; such as great wealth beyond its cultural worth, and in terms of the unjust deprivation of others.

They sin against democracy in so far as their ideal is the welfare of the restricted group, rather than that of the total society of which they are parts; and in so far as they do not make the obligations of this larger society strictly prior, and are not grouped for the sake of service to it, rather than for selfish glorification.

They sin against democracy in so far as they regard themselves, isolated and apart, as the

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real Society, over against the masses, who are conceived as socially alien. In a democracy, there should be no Society, in the insidious meaning of Society *versus* the masses. Any person belongs to some social group; each group, however large or small, however little it may mingle with others, being rightly considered an integral part of that larger society which, alone, is democracy.

And, finally, our hedonistic social sets sin especially against democracy in so far as they tend to become egoistic and unscrupulously, narrowly, self-indulgent; and, therefore, deeply unsocial, and so undemocratic.

Thus, through these sins against democracy, the conditions of genuine social progress are yet far from being fulfilled in America. For, again, the democratic ideal of society came into being and is justified only because, as far as human reason and experience can judge, this conception is the only one that secures an indefinite and complete social progress,—a progress which is ethically real. America has adopted democracy; but society, at least in the restricted sense, is not quite loyal to America's cherished hope.

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This hope may be realized partially within college walls. The defects of the American social sets must here be corrected as much as is practicable, whether expressed in snobbishness of family, or wealth, or display, or intellect; whether through hedonism, or aimlessness; whether incorporated in social cliques, or in such forms of fraternities and sororities and clubs as defy the American idea. Here in the college, if anywhere, should be found at least a remote suggestion of the true social ranking. But it can exist only if the consciousness of the American social order, and the meaning of its persons, are introduced to the students' minds not only as a theory, but as an atmosphere. It is Utopian to expect too much from the colleges in this respect. But it is not Utopian to hope and demand something. Above all, no college should lend itself, as some few "aristocratic" colleges certainly have, to the perpetuation of those very social distinctions which the American college should exist emphatically to discourage.

Fourth, the American social order has its unmistakable implications in the realm of literature and the other arts. A famous musician

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said, during the World War: "It is my conviction that art has as much at stake in this war as democracy." His reason was that true art depends upon true democracy for its future. Since literature is the art most familiar to us, and since it ranks high among the arts, we may allow it to be representative of the arts for the purposes of this discussion.

Now, that there is possible an art distinctively American has been challenged for a number of reasons; reasons which, I think, are answerable. In the first place, it is alleged that we are guilty of the fallacy of False Cause if we suppose that a particular form of government has any direct influence upon art. But the question is not whether democracy, in the restricted sense of democratic government, has any influence upon art; but whether democracy, as a theory of man and society, exemplified in a total national life, has such influence.

Second, it is argued that America has not yet attained a national unity. To this one may reply that America is rapidly attaining a unified self-consciousness, so far as many of the fundamental meanings of its democracy are concerned; that the war has helped to render this

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unity still more real; and that even if a national unity were not yet attained, it is a possibility; and that art should do its unique share to realize it.

Third, it is contended that the modern close intercourse of nations tends towards the obliteration of purely national arts. But the intimate interrelations of peoples cannot obliterate the distinctiveness of America, until all peoples adopt the principles of its social order. And, even then, the distinctiveness of America will richly remain in the uniqueness of the content of that order; a content to which I shall presently refer.

Finally, it is urged that true art is universal in its nature; it transcends national boundaries, just as true logic is the same logic, regardless of places and times. The answer is that the formal elements of art are, indeed, universal; but that the *contentual* elements, while distinguishable from form, cannot be sundered from form; that democracy is most favorable to a sound art, through its insistence upon truth to life and the moral values, in terms of persons, which any genuine esthetic creation involves. Attention should also be called to the fact that,

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besides furnishing the distinctive content of democracy's life as such, America affords the dramatic content peculiar to America's own specific conditions for democracy's realization. This includes such elements as our concrete historical background and movement; the determinations of our national life by the vastness of the country, sectional differences, opportunities for dramatic tendencies counter to democracy in the chances of fortune, and in our inherited and borrowed tendencies; and, above all, and permeating all, the inevitable conflicts, spiritual and material, tragic and comic, belonging to a democracy as yet only in the earlier stages of being realized.

The American social order has hardly begun to express itself through the arts. Some American literature has come nearest to such an expression, especially such as presents to us an apotheosis of the common man and the common life, interpretive of their real meanings. Of course, the first thing is for the American people to value the arts as worth while; and distinctively American art as a desirable possibility. And one of the best ways to achieve this is for educational institutions to lay some stress

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upon the appreciation and creation of the beautiful. I much fear that this is contrary to the main American tradition; certainly, it is contrary to the established tradition of the college. And yet, is the assumption of a genuine relation between truth and beauty mere sentiment? Is there not a real relation, too, between moral and esthetic ideals? We remember how thoroughly Plato thought that there was.

This is not to argue that the college of arts shall be turned into a school of art; to have visions of canvasses and easels and long hair and Byronic collars and a sublimated Latin Quarter. But one may well have a vision of the time when, in America, the beautiful shall no longer be regarded as merely incidental to life, instead of as an important and integral part of life itself. We have the motive of truth in education; in a small measure, too, the motive of morals under various guises. There is place for the motive of beauty as well. It need not and should not be expressed chiefly in special courses in esthetics. It can best be expressed through the education of the imagination; not only through courses in literature, where, however, the possibilities are obvious; but through

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the sciences as well. There is richly possible such a thing as the use of the imagination in scientific matters; does the student ever find it? Does the average instructor himself? Whether or no the future of American art, including literature, depends greatly upon the American college, from it might well be expected great things. The college will have missed one very great phase of its responsibility to the social order, if it continues to ignore what is a fundamental note in any completely rounded civilization.

Fifth, the American order implies distinct ideals of the meaning of religion. Casually, this assertion seems radical, even dangerous. It is, if not characterized with some care. But, a fundamental doctrine of what men are, such as the American order indubitably affords, cannot but have its implications within the realm of religion. The pricelessness of the person is not only a democratic doctrine, but a religious doctrine. So, the social nature of the self implies that democracy's person cannot accept any religion but one with social responsibilities; that it cannot be "saved" in terms of any selfish hedonism. Again, if democracy's

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person is fundamentally rational, religion may not be considered as remote from other intellectual interests, including science, which often seems unwarrantably opposed to it. Further, if persons are free, then religion must spring from within, however validly it may be stimulated from without. And, again, if persons are measureless in capacities, then religion must not be thought of as merely a negative constraint, but as a positive and expanding self-realization.

Such are a few of the religious implications of the American social order. Already, the churches tend to recognize them. Only such religion, whether Christian or Jewish, Catholic or Protestant, can furnish an adequate sanction for democracy's ethical ideals.

And such a sanction is needed. Closely allied to a healthy moral consciousness, is the religious consciousness,—the consciousness of those verities that strongly support and are logically implied by a living moral faith. To fight for the right, effectively and hopefully, is to have some sort of belief in the triumph of the right, which, at any finite moment in human history, is never fully victorious; indeed, often appar-

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ently defeated. It means a living faith in some power that makes for righteousness.

While it is not the business of the non-sectarian college, with manifest obligations to the democracy of thought, to insist upon any too particular interpretation of religious verities (beyond their general spirit, as just outlined) no college should prejudice its youths against them, directly or indirectly. Yet, indirectly, and wholly unintentionally, this has certainly been done. It has been done because the concepts of physical science, confident through their successes over all other methods and contents of truth, have been taught in such a context as to insure the corollary of scepticism concerning the unseen verities. The so-called "rationalism" of some of our larger colleges is mostly the pretension of the natural science method to decide all questions; a pretension of concepts to which I have referred, and which a new education must controvert. Almost any expert in the logic of method knows better; but his is a still, small voice, unheeded among the more strident achievements which present themselves for acclaim in the world of the obvious.

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Such "rationalism" is irrational. A new emphasis upon the intangible, yet supremely real values which all facts must subserve, if they are to have the least glimmer of educational meaning, will involve the resurrection of the age-old rights of the realities we are accustomed to call "religious" to a consideration at least impartial. True education may yet mean the reasonable transfiguration of life, morally and religiously. After the tyranny of an age of "facts," some of earth's older glories may return to show how indispensable these facts of science indeed are; yet, how insufficient they ever must be, when left to their own barren services to themselves.

Education may yet give us not only life's reason, but something of its inspiration, too!

XII

THE LARGEST TERMS OF CULTURE

THERE may have been growing in the mind of the reader a feeling that to conceive of education as motivated solely by the social order of one's own particular country is to narrow education unduly, and to be in direct conflict with the traditional and honored notion of the truly educated man. For, has it not always been part of our ideal of a man of true culture that his sympathies shall embrace all countries and times? That his shall be a cosmopolitan mind, a citizen of that world-democracy of thought which transcends all interests merely temporary and local? Surely it would be a calamity if, for this broader notion of culture, should be substituted an insular notion. Indeed, would it not be very much like the recently deprecated Ger-

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man idea of culture, which tended to exclude all other cultures as inferior or negligible, and which made education function for that particular *régime* known as the German state? Surely America, of all countries, must not surrender itself to any such narrow view of a liberal education!

All this would be a justifiable and even fatal criticism were it not that the American social order, by its very nature, implies and calls for the international order; if the American consciousness did not mean both a broad international consciousness and an international conscience. This international consciousness is implied, first of all, in America's emphasis upon the social nature of the individual,—an emphasis upon the fact that human beings are interdependent in all the interests that go to make up human welfare, and upon the desirability of this fact. The fact itself is clear. For all that he values most, the modern man must rely upon the social institutions of which he is a part, and for whose being and progress he and his fellows are responsible. His education, his pleasures, his economic prosperity, his religion; his literary, artistic and scientific culture,

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—all these are social in their nature, and unattainable save in coöperation with his fellowmen. This is true for any country deeply concerned with twentieth century things; but for Americans it is not an accident, but the necessary implication of the social nature of men, as expressed in the fundamental rights and obligations inalienable from the consciousness of an American. Now, add that all social institutions are, perforce, such that they transcend any and all national boundaries; that every one of them is part of an international life; and that, for their full development, they demand the international consciousness and conscience; then, at once, the truly educated man becomes as cosmopolitan as ever he was—yes, more so—for now it is not merely a cosmopolitanism of scholarship, although it includes this; but a cosmopolitanism of active aims and imperative responsibilities. The educated man becomes a citizen of the world in a sense more real than ever before; indeed, real for the first time. And, in a large sense, his fellow-citizens belong to all ages. In the social order conceived dynamically, in living relation to past and future, it is a liberal fact that Socrates and Dante are his

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compatriots in the only actual republic of minds which embraces all spaces and all times. So the educated man shall not neglect the eternal things that make plausible the high motive of truth for truth's sake, the ideals of liberal culture and of disinterested thinking. Let us not forget this.

Or, if you please, an international and interracial consciousness just as truly follows from the American notion of freedom, which is a freedom at once rational and social. Democratic freedom—the freedom to seek the social goal—cannot be arrested at geographical points. It becomes a doctrine meaning a world-goal, or it contradicts itself. The liberty of the individual interprets the liberty of the group, even if the group be called a nation. America proclaims that there is only one liberty of nations and races, as well as of individuals,—the liberty that is thoroughly social; the liberty of each nation to seek the international goal, in accordance, indeed, with the reason of each nation, but voluntarily and freely subject to the revision of all. National aims mean international aims; national responsibilities mean international responsibilities; a national con-

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science means an international conscience; national democracy means international democracy. The educated man would not be educated without this international mind.

So it is the business of the American college to train men for the world-order, not in spite of its responsibilities to the American order, but because of them. Fortunately, the issues of the World War have given an invaluable stimulus to the international spirit among Americans. Never before has the average man of any country so had his vision widened by a compelled attention to the questions of international welfare and ideals. Every phase of the fundamental principles involved in the relations of nations and of races and of cultures has been emphasized and brought to his notice, and has become part of his daily thought and conversation. This daily reaction upon a great international situation is, perhaps, the most pervasive and important educational force that has ever molded the popular mind of any country. It will contribute mightily to the formation of the character of the American, not only of this generation, but of the future.

The continuation of this stimulus to inter-

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national thinking must be sustained by American educational institutions, not only in the interests of culture, but in the interests of the immediate issues of world-reconstruction. Here, the responsibilities of the college are undeniable. The project of a League of Nations means the vital need of training for world-citizenship. And if, by any chance, the project should fail, the absence of such a formal recognition of international responsibilities renders such a training even more imperative. While the war has done much to lead the American to international thinking, his traditions are very much against it; and these traditions are likely to gain a hazardous ascendancy at a critical time. We Americans are, traditionally, intensely patriotic, intensely nationalistic; as we may well continue to be. But, as a people, we tend to think that, somehow, nationalism and internationalism are irreconcilable; that patriotism means not only my country, but my country against the world. Incidentally this was the way a certain recent imperial foe of democracy led his people to conceive patriotism. Such a conception of national interests is not worthy of perpetuation. The American college

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may well lend its influence toward creating minds that see clearly that there need be no conflict at all between enlightened national patriotism on the one hand, and loyalty to the great world-interests on the other; that an enlightened patriotism not only tolerates but selfishly demands world-rights and world-duties; that no individual nation need lose its national integrity, any more than our individual states lose their integrity, although federated for the common weal; that variety and unity may go together, must go together, if the highest things of human welfare are to be conserved.

In what ways may the college educate toward this international mindedness?

There should be more international conferences on education, and more international educational coöperation; perhaps, even, an international bureau of education. The international interchange of professors should be encouraged as never before, and in a more universal and systematic way. The international interchange of students is just as important; although the tendency, for some time, is likely to be a stress upon American education for Americans. This stress is correct enough, within measure; but

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it should not exclude study abroad by American students, who will both help and be helped by the contact with alien cultures. We should encourage students of other nations to come to American colleges; not only for their own sakes, but for the sake of ourselves. Cosmopolitan clubs within our colleges should be encouraged, and should yield a more wide-spread influence than in the past. Within the region of each social science taught to undergraduates, some attention might well be paid to contemporary social movements in other nations; nations which, thereby, shall not be thought of as merely governments, but as fellow-peoples, with fundamental interests and struggles very like our own; and upon the success of which our own success is dependent. With the spread of democracy, it is to be hoped that the study of countries will become more and more the study of men and women; not chiefly of their political machinery. The study of American history should make clear just what our living American culture owes to the cultures of other peoples, living and dead. And the study of history and of the social sciences in general should be so managed that the student shall not know

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more of dead civilizations than of the living civilizations with which he is in living relation, if he really lives at all. A course in at least one modern language should be required, and required to the extent that it will lead to a reading knowledge of some of its literature. The modern language clubs, now so prevalent in our colleges, may well be used as valuable educational adjuncts for the purpose of discussing foreign contemporary life, and of becoming somewhat acquainted with the leading foreign journals of opinion.

These are merely a few suggestions. But, however it shall be accomplished, the American college will not have fulfilled its obligation to the American social order until it yields, as its type of the educated man, a mind that has begun to feel its cultural and moral relations to the world-currents of its time, and of all times.

We are now ready for a larger educational implication of the American order, taken as a whole. In a previous discussion, there was suggested the institution of correlation-courses in the latter years of the college course. We now have the material of such a correlation-course

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ready to hand. For, not only the teacher, but the student must be aware of the larger aims of his own college culture. They can be communicated through a course which will include and, in a broad way, interrelate the various sides of American life which have been reviewed,—political, economic, social, esthetic, moral and religious; yes, and international. Such a course might be entitled *Present Day Institutions*, or *American Civilization*, or *American Ideals*. It should be given coöperatively by the departments concerned. A correlation like this does not mean an impossible mastery of all the subjects related. But it would give the student definite encouragement to relate his subjects in a living way; and it would communicate to him a breadth of vision that would transfigure his entire education. Incidentally, such a course would be one practical means of enlarging the vision of the teacher, through his coöperation with his colleagues in creating such a perspective of the concrete life for which the college exists. An earlier and preparatory sort of correlation-course could be made in conjunction with classes in English composition. The themes of composition could be vitalized by

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making them such problems as require a modest synthesis of those fields of knowledge which the student's education has thus far given him; and which especially suggest the problems that are to become more and more imperative, as the motives of his later education.

But there is another medium of correlation suggested by a final question which might well be asked concerning the American democracy. We started out with the problem of discovering national ideals, the ideals of the American people as a whole, expressed in their popular institutions. Yet, just beneath the surface, we have been dealing, all along, with the kinds of ideal selves that individuals, rather than nations as such, seek as their moral goals. For a society has no ideals at all save those which are formed by the individuals that comprise that society. A social ideal is nothing more or less than the purpose which its individuals have in getting together. The ideal is ever the ideal of individuals; a social ideal is simply that ideal in terms of which individuals, inalienably social, coöperate.

Thus, the ultimate purpose of every people, whether or not it is fully aware of it, is to make

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possible a certain kind of life in a certain kind of society; in other words, to achieve the prevalent ideal of what men ought to be, the life they ought to live and have a right to live. In this sense, what are the reasons which justify America's institutions,—her politics, her form of social groupings, her literature, her schools and colleges, her predominant religious tendencies? *What sort of American are we trying to develop, or, at least, tending to develop between these seas?* From the analysis of the American social order and its theory of the person, we already know that he is priceless; social; free; equal; measureless in capacities. But measureless in capacities for what? So far, we have only the indispensable conditions for his self-realization; but what sort of person will the American be when he does adequately realize himself?

Do not forget that he is rational. Perhaps this is his salvation. For, among all ideals possible, surely it is reasonable to suppose that only one is preëminently rational. But which ideal is it? If the history of civilization is not a story of caprice, but of reason unfolding itself, in however tortuous a way, then it is that

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one ideal which is the fullest expression of human progress, rightly interpreted. This ideal, whatever it is, has, perforce, been present, though unconsciously, from the first, molding inexorably the institutions of men.

But, again, does anybody know just what this ideal is? A philosopher may deduce it from the possibilities of human nature; but other philosophers are likely to disagree with him. How far will the ideal American exemplify the virtues of the intellect, whether it be that of the logician, or the scholar, or the creative imagination? How far will he prize the life of pleasure? Will his mood reincarnate the spirit of the cultured Greek, and discover him worshipping at the shrine of Beauty, deifying her as the summit of human attainment? Will he have any use at all for asceticism? Or will he become a confirmed devotee of such sensationalism as to-day characterizes much of our popular play and much of our daily reading? How far will he glorify the will by aspiring to the seats of the mighty? Or, through "the strenuous life?" Or, may it be that he will seek to fulfill all these parts of life without discrimination, so far as in him lies?

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The American social order, as such, cannot speak decisively upon these questions, so subtly elusive. Still, it is fairly easy to discover some of the things which the ideal American is not, according to the popular consciousness. He does not value intellect for its own sake, whether it be expressed in erudition, in speculative reason, or in constructive imagination. Nor is he a man of feeling, primarily, although he is by no means an ascetic. If we seek affirmative traits, we find that he has an undoubted tendency to stress "the rounded man," the virtues of versatility and cosmopolitanism, the ideal of fullness of life. And, if there is any further decided trait in the ideal American, it is that of the glorification of the will as expressed in deeds, rather than in mere consciousness of power. Thus, the two chief American virtues are optimism and courage. It is for the sake of deeds that all intellect exists; and, in this service, intellect is priceless; but intellect must be pragmatic, or it will be discouraged as indulging in "mere theory." It is in connection with deeds that feelings and sentiments also find their legitimate place,—such as the feeling of pleasure. The supreme pleasure

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is that which accompanies action and the sure sense of growing accomplishment.

We need not evaluate this ideal, save to note that it, too, is a version of the rounded man, who expresses fullness of life; and so, in abundant measure, it reveals the decisive demand of the American social order that its persons shall be social and rational and, thus, genuinely worthy of measureless development. The American college will not cast its men in a lesser mold. It will discourage all narrow perversions of it on the part of its teachers, who, as we have seen, tend to the glorification of intellect; particularly, the logical and erudite versions of it; and it will discourage such perversions on the part of the students, who tend toward the glorification of self-assertion and caprice, and the calculus of the seeker for pleasure.

We have now completed our brief and tentative analysis of the American order and of its more obvious corollaries for the American college. The institutions that have been reviewed are those that the college not only must express but positively must help to fashion. Fundamental methods have been suggested by which the American of the future may be prepared by

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his college for this great task. Surely, the ideal before us cannot now justly be accused of any fatal vagueness. Even as thus briefly defined, it is more definite than "scholarship," "liberal culture," "efficiency," or the other ideals in the interests of which college education ostensibly proceeds. As for vocational efficiency, the motive urged here pleads for itself as a corrective of a too narrow, albeit thoroughly definite ideal; and yet, would not exclude it. As for "education for citizenship," it finds this ideal excellent; but, taken just by itself, not only too indefinite, but tending to lay too much stress upon adaptation to institutions rather than to ideals; and, further, tending to isolate the political institution, in particular, as the chief realm of obligation, instead of recognizing the social order as a whole.

No, the American social order is not vague, nor are its educational implications vague. If an absolute and final delineation of that order be asked,—such is forever impossible and undesirable not only here, but for any sane educational ideal. And now emerges an important truth. Moral progress is misconceived utterly if it is supposed that, before it can occur, men

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must be quite decided with respect to just what the ultimate and all-embracing goal of progress is, in the sense of being able to define it in every smallest detail. If this were the condition of moral progress, there never would be any moral progress. No, a significant part—the very soul—of moral progress is progress in the definition of the goal of progress! Part of our moral advance is advance in moral knowledge, as well as in the deeds that moral knowledge makes possible. We set up what ideal we may, rarely too consciously or completely, and struggle toward that as a working hypothesis; well knowing that, since the complete ideal of man is rational, any ideal which he seriously and honestly follows will, just because it is incomplete, lead to the larger and fuller ideal of which it is a rational part. Thus, if it be required that the American college shall be organized upon a complete consciousness of the perfect social order, it will never be organized at all; or, it will be organized upon the basis of a treacherous dogmatism, which may very well lead to a tragi-comedy. But this does not mean that the American order does not and must not, to the degree of its self-consciousness, have a com-

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mon ideal. A society has this, or it is no society; for the fundamental unity that makes it a society—one society, however loosely one—is the common adoption, consciously or semi-consciously, of a common purpose.

In the growing discovery of what this purpose means, the college has its priceless part. The one precondition is that the college shall fearlessly accept the purpose itself and struggle to fulfill it.

XIII

HOW MAY THESE THINGS BE?

WE have attempted a voyage of discovery, which we hoped would culminate in what might be called a second discovery of America. We suspected that this discovery would mean the finding of the college of to-morrow.

The *corpus* of America was discovered by Columbus long ago; but who may discover its soul? Not one man, surely! Nevertheless, every man who feels the importance of the obligation must do his best. We have seen how big is the task,—as are all tasks done critically in the service of a cautiously constructive idealism. Our result is not likely to be all wrong. It is avowedly incomplete, and only the basis of educational elaboration; but incompleteness and vagueness are not the same. Suggestions have been made

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concerning the educational corollaries of such an America as has been defined; but, in case this interpretation of America be considered unsound, much emphasis has been laid upon such readjustments of college education as are involved in the mere acceptance of the American social order as a directing motive, however it be defined.

Again, and yet again, it has been insisted that the main avenue of the college professor's expression of his obligation to the social order is through his teaching of undergraduates. There is such a thing as creative research; there is also such a thing—in prospect—as creative teaching! The writer has gone so far as to suggest some specific changes in the matter and manner of our college curricula. At this point, it might be expected that he would propose a tolerably complete plan for the college curricula of the future, with an exact outline of the educational function of each of the social and natural sciences. Certainly, he will make no attempt of this kind here; first, for the reason that the proposed educational motive can be achieved in a variety of ways; and, second, because if great stress should be laid here upon

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educational machinery, the real message of this book might be missed and the letter substituted for the spirit. For the secret of the college of to-morrow will be a definite moral consciousness on the part of both teachers and students. In spite of the sentimental misuse of the notion, the personality and the intimate convictions of the teacher are paramount. Without these, all educational machinery utterly fails. This essay does not deal primarily with machinery. The machinery will take good care of itself. We academic minds, through long training, are quite facile in creating and repairing it!

Whatever the curricula of the future, or the instruments of its administration, the educational program proposed here no doubt means more supervision of the student than at present prevails. If it be objected that it is presumptuous to suppose that the educator can so surely know what the true purpose of education is that he can confidently impose it upon his students, one may answer that it is still more presumptuous in him to assume that his students know. Somebody has to know. The educator has the first responsibility, and may as well accept it. Our social order recently went so far as a con-

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scription of lives, in the name of democracy. A conscription of part of the student's time, in the interests of a broad educational purpose, is not a fatal thing; it may be done in the service of the same democracy.

So much for the purely educational function of the undergraduate college. But it has a research function, as well; a function which should be jealously guarded. Here, as has been insisted upon, the academic mind, as such, however ridiculed and belittled, finds a legitimate place for its valuable traits. Certainly, the graduate school of the college should not hesitate to train men for research. The teacher of undergraduates, too, should as certainly be encouraged in productive thinking. But the motives of college teaching and research should no longer be identified as they have been. Both have been assumed, as a matter of course, to be for the unique product roughly designated by the name of scholarship. This has been encouraged by the growing tendency of college administrators to stress success in research as an almost sufficient qualification for success in teaching, and as a basis for the promotion of teachers. There should be a sharp separation

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between the function of research, on the one hand, and of teaching, on the other. This does not mean that the teacher shall not be a man of research, or the man of research a teacher. Whether research and teaching be done by differentiated groups of men, or by the same man, is largely a matter of practical emergency, of the nature of the field of knowledge under consideration, and of widely varying conditions that attend the development of imperfect institutions under special circumstances constantly changing.

But, not only in teaching, but even in research itself, there ought to be present, to some extent, the obligation to the social order. One has an obligation to truth for truth's sake; but, even in its search, the expert has an obligation to the world of concrete purposes. A more emphatic recognition of this latter obligation, on the part of men of research, ought to be urged; and, in doing so, we should recognize this momentous fact,—that the search for truth in terms of concrete purposes reacts upon the conception of what truth really is, and lends to the academic truth-seeker a seldom used but indispensable test of the fact and meaning of all his

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truth,—namely, its living place in the world of living values.

The college of to-morrow and the new America! How shall they enter into this genuine partnership, progress together, each aiding the other to a full self-consciousness, and toward the same demanding purposes? The desirability and some of the fundamental conditions of such a *rapprochement* have been stressed. But how may these things be? Can they be at all?

No one is so visionary as to suppose that we can have ideal colleges in America, or anywhere else; any more than we can have a perfect social order. We are not looking for an ideal college in an ideal society. Our ideal is avowedly ambitious, as is any worthy educational program. We must be content with approximations to it. It is not to be expected that such an exacting idealism will find its true import all at once. There will be a time of transition, of course,—all times are such. It is even to be expected that, in the conflict of ideals, abortive and silly fads will gain temporary sway. But, out of the chaos, will come order; and a new reconciliation of all the ideals that now fight for exclusive mastery.

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Yet, even so, such a program as has been urged seems almost impossible of accomplishment. To make it effective involves not only a transformation of the aims and methods of college education, but of the high school, from which most of our college youths come, with irreversible choices already made. To whom or to what shall we look for the accomplishment of the next logical stage in the development of the American college?

Public opinion? Public opinion will help, as it already has helped the college to question its efficiency and to modify its standards,—although not always for the best. If the college is to think purposively, instead of academically, the public opinion of America exerts a pervasive and irresistible influence in this very direction. For America is undoubtedly a nation of confirmed idealists. Furthermore, this idealism has already proved itself in crises, as being no merely materialistic idealism; but an idealism which, although ill defined, is of the same temper as that which should pervade the college, and which the college ultimately cannot withstand. But public opinion, although bringing to bear the pressure of a high utilitarianism

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upon its institutions, cannot readjust the college efficiently, because it is not sufficiently interested or informed and articulate enough, to effect definite and sure educational reforms.

Governmental encouragement of the right sort would help. If the American social order and the college so vitally depend upon one another, the logic of the state's aggressive participation in education becomes apparent at once. Perhaps the federal government may well enlarge its educational responsibilities; and, in doing so, might be in a position to impose a broadly national vision upon higher education, as Plato thought the ideal republic should do. But governmental bureaus are, by their very nature, conservative, especially in a democracy; and, normally, government is slower than any other agency of the social order to inaugurate far-reaching reforms.

Shall we look to the colleges themselves? What does one mean by that? Boards of trustees? They might do something. But, save in some sectarian colleges, boards of trustees interfere little, if at all, with the imposing of definite educational policies upon the college. It has even been considered as extremely im-

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portant for academic freedom, that this be so. It is emphatically desirable that this continue to be so.

Perhaps our hope might well be placed in college presidents and deans,—in spite of the fact that the modern college administrator tends to be a servant of the established order, whatever his personal desires for reform; and is often, perforce, engrossed too much in business and administrative details which exclude to some extent the chance of purely educational leadership. Yet, here we have reason to expect much. For our college administrators have shown themselves interested in educational policy and progressive reform; and have made themselves expert in educational issues, as have no other group of men, not excepting college professors themselves, who have grown accustomed to look to presidents and deans for sane educational guidance. But, much as college administrators have done for the progress of higher education—and to them we owe much of such progress—all that they could do by themselves could never accomplish the readjustment of the college to the social order in the ways suggested, even granted that they desired to do so.

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Our ultimate hope is not in public opinion, nor in governmental encouragement, nor in trustees, nor even in administrators. Our ultimate hope is in the college professor himself.

We started our inquiry with the college professor; our problem ends with the college professor; its solution is the college professor.

The college is made or unmade by its teachers. The business of the college is education and research. It is the college teacher who does these things. He even writes the books he teaches. In all this, he has attained enough liberty to make him chiefly responsible for what the college shall become.

Our appeal must be to the academic mind itself, fully conscious of its conservatism and inertia with regard to the larger issues of educational policy. We must appeal to it, because it has the educational business of the college directly in its charge. Students are not educated in administrative offices, but in the classroom. The function of research is not done in the trustees' rooms, but in the laboratory. Administrators are keenly aware that no far-reaching educational reform can proceed without the earnest coöperation of the great corps

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of college teachers. No such reform is likely to be permanently effective, unless it emerges directly from the aggressive convictions of the college professor himself.

But a significant fact obtrudes. The majority of college teachers do not recognize their obligations to the social order at all. How shall they attain that imperative consciousness, without which all genuine educational readjustment is simply impossible?

There is only one way. Those who have already attained such a consciousness must spread the contagion to those who have it not. Administrators have the machinery ready to hand in bodies already organized, such as the various associations of colleges and universities. The professors have it at hand in the American Association of University Professors, which has already achieved much for the American college and from which we may expect vastly more of a constructive nature. Local groups of teachers in almost every college are adapted to the efficient discussion of the new values in education. Even faculty meetings may yet wake up! The problems are already in the air. All that needs to be done now is to attack them reso-

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lutely with all the resources of our combined experience and insight, united with our desire for an American educational *régime* freed from traditions that are not pertinent, and adjusted to the urgent call of the new order.

But all this involves a momentous thing—a well nigh Quixotic thing—the transformation of the academic mind. This transformation of the college teacher must reach back to his own training. That he should, consciously or unconsciously, proceed as though the aim of all his teaching were the scholarly ideal is natural. If the truth were known, it is largely the result of the unique process through which he has gone to obtain his degree of Doctor of Philosophy, now demanded by most colleges of rank as a sufficient license to teach college subjects. Of course, some standard of proficiency has to be required; but what sort of mind does a Ph.D. training tend to create? What things does one do to be transformed from plain John Smith to John Smith, Ph.D.?

He specializes in one subject; or, rather, in one special aspect of a special field of a special subject, for an average of at least three years. The center of his work is a thesis; and the cen-

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tral idea of this thesis is "research" of a sort that is supposed to reach a so-called "contribution to knowledge." So-called, for, really, one does not commonly create to order contributions to knowledge. And what kind of knowledge is it, such as it is? Not a knowledge of the pedagogy of his subject; or its educational or even logical relation to other subjects; or its relation to the life outside academic purlieus, unless one's research be in certain of the applied sciences. No, the easiest way and the only way for the average man to create even an appearance of new knowledge is to go even more minutely into a minute aspect of a field already pretty well worked. So, the kind of knowledge he creates is, in the nature of the case, highly abstract,—carefully separated from every other field of learning, and subtly abstracted from every other subdivision of his own field.

The writer has before him the pleasant bulk of a monograph of this kind, accepted by the faculty of one of our foremost universities. What admiration one must lavish, forsooth, upon the very form of this typically modern product of scholarship! How deftly are exemplified the canons that should prevail in all

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Doctors' theses, not written for the mere and sordid benefit of the race! Add to this that there are references to no less than one hundred and three authorities, by actual count.

This contribution to knowledge bears a title which, like so many titles of learned monographs, might seem trivial enough to the unthinking rabble, whom, of course, we scholars can afford to ignore. The title is, *The Place of Phaseolus Vulgaris* [Beans] *among the Pythagoreans; a Study of the Esoteric Doctrine, with Especial Emphasis upon its Relation to Metempsychosis*. The author quotes Hegel's remark that "several Pythagoreans, being pursued, preferred to die than to damage a field of beans." (*Vid.* Porphyry, Iamblicus and Diogenes Laertius.) His immediate problem is to solve the reason of this incredible respect for beans. He is much troubled, as well he might be. It is hard to see why one should respect beans, let alone die for them. Respect is a strong word. Kant it was who pointed out that respect is reserved for Persons, not for mere Things. Is not a bean a Thing? The author of this thesis scouts the explanation of Diogenes Laertius that the Pythagoreans ab-

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stained from beans not from respect, but because "such abstinence made the visions which appear in one's sleep gentle and free from agitation." (Diog. Laert., VIII, 19.) This, our author holds, is a doctrine strangely plausible, and is the esoteric doctrine, to be sure; but not the inner doctrine of the Master. He then propounds the startling hypothesis which is the bold claim of this thesis as a credential to teach philosophy to undergraduates. But we forbear.

Thus it is that whether it be *Phaseolus Vulgaris*, or something else, minute scholarship and research solely or chiefly earn, at last, the coveted degree that becomes the certificate of right to prepare the Americans of to-morrow to fight the battles of life. Is it any wonder that what has been the supreme value for the potential professor during those years that made him a teacher should continue to be the supreme value in his actual teaching? Would it not be a miracle if any other value found a regnant place? Only a larger mind and heart than even the high average possessed by college teachers could survive such a training without a sense deadened to all but the glory of the academic. So the new-fledged Doctor teaches as he has

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been taught; the endless circle goes on, scholars teaching students as though they were material for future scholars, type producing type,—failing egregiously with the undergraduate, but amply succeeding with the college teachers of to-morrow. Round about the cauldron go; more and more emphasis upon research, more and more evaluating of the professor's academic standing in its terms, academic promotion and calls to better chairs in its name, until research becomes primary and teaching secondary, and the student's need sacrificed to the personal and professional ideals of the teacher and the glory of his Subject.

Just what, in detail, is the best training for the college teacher is one of the next imperative problems. The intrenchment of time-honored traditions will render the solution slow and full of hazard. But what the transformation of the academic mind may mean is strikingly illustrated by recent events.

War is ever a marvelous shifter of emphasis and a purifier of values. And, during the World War, we saw academic minds gradually transformed, under the stress of public need. It was necessary that all the expert resources of

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the nation should be utilized to the limit of their power. The result was either the awareness by many of us of how useless to the social order our special callings really were; or, the inspiration to begin the active discharge of obligations to our country, through the knowledge of our respective specialties, in ways in which we never before dreamed to make them of worth. Psychologists found themselves serving armies in a technical way, or lecturing to soldiers on the practical psychology of war, or the psychology of command. Economists were called to appear before committees for expert opinion; or they were placed upon commissions to solve immediate problems. Educational experts were sent over-seas to take care of the practical needs of the minds of the defenders of civilization. Historians and political scientists were put to work on commissions preparing data for the peace conferences. Sociologists were induced to study races and social institutions, with a view to practical plans for social revision. Philosophers sought to interpret the philosophic meaning of the life of peoples, and the life-meaning of the philosophies of peoples, with a view of better understanding the war and the

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future. And almost all the experts in these various fields were asked to utilize their heretofore academic knowledge in giving to prospective soldiers war-aims courses that should furnish the men in uniform a concrete thing of such stupendous meaning that they would be willing to fight for it and to die for it!

So far as the specialist was successful in all this, he abandoned his purely academic outlook for the purpose in hand. It did not and should not have meant that he forsook his academic obligations. He merely kept them where they belonged. For the special purpose of serving the social order, he found himself transformed from his habitual academic ways of seeing things, and knew himself as a dweller in a unique world of truth. For this same special purpose, this same transformation must, here and now, be carried to its full completion, not only by the few whom the stress of war called, but by the many, who yet do not recognize world obligations.

Let us see what this transformation meant and must continue to mean. We have already reviewed what sort of attributes the specialist needs in his academic obligations; and we have devoted a chapter to defending them from carp-

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ing critics. Now let us see what kinds of traits the specialist requires to serve the social order. It is just these traits that he will need as a teacher of the undergraduate in this same service.

If, in his academic field, he must be free from the distractions of the world, here he needs the virtue of worldliness. There, he requires inordinate caution; here, the venturesome spirit; there, a judicial mindedness and a suspension of judgment; here, accurate and quick decision. There, he serves truth alone; here, concrete human purposes. There, his medium is pure reason; here, a high order of imagination also. There, his emotions would hinder; here, he must have broad sympathies and common human feelings. There, he works with abstractions from life; here, he works with life itself. There, he isolates his field from all others; here, he relates it to all others. There, he is a scientist only; here, he is a man among men. There, he never intrudes his truth upon the world; here, he insists upon it with the fire of sane enthusiasms. Here, he needs humor, an aggressive and sacrificing sense of moral responsibility, the skill to convince with tongue and pen, the wisdom

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to understand the meaning of his age, as well as the precise things the educator must do to shape it efficiently to the utter genius of its possibilities.

The signs of the times are clear; of one thing we may be absolutely sure. Inevitably, American education will be refashioned upon some more or less utilitarian basis. The impending error is that this basis will be the thing nearest to hand,—vocationalism, or some of the strident forms of materialistic efficiency. This is natural, because of America's constant association of the utilitarian with the practical, the definite with the concrete, the material, the tangible, what appeals to the senses. We must save the American college from such second-rate purposes in a day when, nevertheless, the college must amply and promptly justify itself by *some* purpose. Let the college be practical, by all means; let it be efficient to the utmost; but let it be in the service of that practical idealism, of that idealistic efficiency, which we have shown to be the underlying genius of the American spirit at its best. There was once a Prussianized efficiency; we knew what that was and were sorry about it. There is such a

HOW MAY THESE THINGS BE?

thing as an American efficiency, too; let us know what that is, and be glad for it!

Through such a transformation in the spirit of its ideals, through such a vision of service to the American order and to the world, the college of the new America shall at last put all truth to its predestined test and service and prove the worth of the sacrifices that have been made for it in all ages. Only through such a transformation in education can the new America itself be lifted from a mere dream to a resolute fact.

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


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